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Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The
Empire Strikes Back
CHARLES H. BROWER 1I*

This Article examines the growing opposition to
arbitration of investor-state disputes involving
challenges to regulatorymeasures under Chapter11 of
NAFTA.
The NAFTA Parties apparently seek to
restore national sovereignty over such matters by
subjecting these awards to heightened review by
municipal courts at the seat of arbitration,effectively
giving Canadian,Mexican, and United States courts
the final authority to interpret Chapter 11. When
successful, this practice violates both the letter of
Chapter 11 and the intent of the NAFTA Parties to
place investor-state disputes within the deferential
legal framework of international commercial
arbitration.Although the NAFTA Partiesmay, escape
liability for such unlawful conduct, they threaten to
undermine the past century's efforts to promote robust
principles of state responsibilityfor economic injuries
to aliens. Furthermore, routine derogationfrom the
principle of voluntary acceptance of authoritative
decisions rendered at the international level by
impartial bodies charged with supervision of treaty
compliance bodes ill for the development of the rule of
law in internationaleconomic relations.

I.
II.
HI.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 44
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER 11 ..................48
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK ............................................... 51

* Croft Assistant Professor of International Law and Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer in
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the
financial support of Dean Samuel M. Davis and the Lamar Order.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

IV.

[40:43

ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTENT, ARCHITECTURE, AND

HEIGHTENED REVIEW ..........................................................

69

A. The Role of Nature andIntent in Defining
"Commercial" Arbitration........................................... 69
B. The Architecture of Chapter11 .................................... 74
V.

LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNILATERAL

V I.

REVIEW ............................................................................... 81
CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 88

I.

INTRODUCTION

Once described as an "overwhelmingly positive" investment
regime, 1 Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 2 has become a lightning rod for opponents of globalization
and the intrusion of international law into domestic affairs.3 The
growing resistance to Chapter 11 emanates from over one dozen
claims brought by NAFTA investors against Canada, Mexico, and the
United States (collectively, the "NAFTA Parties"). 4 Heard by panels
1. Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Main, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and
Investment Disputes,2 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 82, 115 (1996).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639-49
[hereinafter NAFTA].
3. See, e.g., William Greider, Sovereign Corporations,THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at
5 (describing Chapter 11 as "the smoking gun in the intensifying argument over whether
globalization trumps national sovereignty"); Bruce Stokes, Talk About Unintended
Consequences!, NAT'L J., May 26, 2001, at 1592 (referring to Chapter 11 as "the new cause
cdlbre among free-trade critics").
4. See Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear
and Equilibrium, 28 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with author);
Daniel M. Price, Chapter ]]-Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 113 (2000). Because
many of the submissions in Chapter 11 proceedings are confidential, writers frequently
cannot obtain sufficient information about the existence or nature of pending disputes. See
HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1999), available at http://www.iisd.org/trade/Chapterl l.htm; Kevin Banks, NAFTA 's Article
110-Can Regulation Be Expropriation?,5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 499, 501 (1999);
Chi Carmody, Beyond the Proposals:Public Participationin InternationalEconomic Law,
15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1321, 1342-43 (2000); Sabrina Safrin et al., InternationalLegal
Developments in Review (PublicInternationalLaw/EnvironmentalLaw), 34 INT'L LAW. 707,
725 (2000); J. Martin Wagner, InternationalInvestment, Expropriationand Environmental
Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 487 (1999); Julia Ferguson, Note and
Comment, California's MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an
Environmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. &
POL'Y 499, 506, 513 (2000); Stephen L. Kass, Regulatory Takings Reopened: Surprising,
PotentiallySignificant, Context Is NAFTA Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 2000, at 82. The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) should provide access to relevant documents within the
possession, custody, or control of the Department of Justice (which is handling Loewen
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of three arbitrators, these claims seek billions of dollars in damages
and challenge a variety of regulatory measures, including measures
that ostensibly protect public health, safety, and the environment;
establish import and export controls; and implement treaties.5 A few
claims even attack the legitimacy of important governmental services,
including the judicial systems of Massachusetts and Mississippi,
which proud citizens might characterize as models for the rest of the
world." These developments horrify Canadian and U.S. publicists,
who denounce the "aggressive" 7 use of investor-state arbitration as an

Group, Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (1998), availableat
http://wvw.naftaclaims.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2001)) and the State Department (which is
handling all other Chapter 11 claims). In response to the author's FOIA request of October 5,
2000, the Department of Justice provided documents on the Loewen case and waived copying
and search fees. The State Department's regulations indicate that it "shall" waive or reduce
search and copying fees, provided that "[d]isclosure of the information is in the public
interest.., and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 22 C.F.R. §
171.15 (2001). Surprisingly, the State Department initially denied the author's October 5,
2000 request for a fee waiver on the grounds that disclosure would not serve the public
interest. Following an administrative appeal, the State Department agreed in principle to
some fee reduction during the summer of 2001. As of this writing, the author and the State
Department have not agreed on the amount or nature of the fee reduction. Therefore, the
author has not received any responsive documents from the State Department. Under the
circumstances, the author has endeavored to provide accurate information, but recognizes that
it may not be complete.
Readers interested in Chapter 11 proceedings may find partial collections of
primary documents on the Internet at http://www.appletonlaw.com; http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/naftae.asp;
http://www.iisd.org/trade/investmentregime.htm;
http://
wwwv.methanex.com/investorcentre/MTBE.htm; http://www.naftaclaims.com; http://www.
peacelaw.com; http:/vww.worldbank.org/icsid/index.html.
5. Brower, supra note 4, at 9.
6. See id. at 6, 8-9. In two cases, Canadian investors have claimed that state court
proceedings in Massachusetts and Mississippi either caused or contributed to violations of
Articles 1102 (national treatment), 1105 (minimum standard of treatment), and 1110
(measures tantamount to expropriation). See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Notice of
Arbitration, at paras. 127-33, 138-39, 141-48, 150, http://www.naftaclaims.com; see also
Loewen Group, Inc., Notice of Claim at 2-3. In another case, United Parcel Service of
America, Inc. claims that the operations of Canada Post (Canada's national mail service)
violate Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1105 (minimum standard of treatment), and
result in the unlawful use of a letter-mail monopoly to cross-subsidize non-monopolized
businesses. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under Section B of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement at paras. 5-16, 19, 25-3 1, http://www.dfait-maeci.ge.ca/tna-nac/nafta-e.asp.
7. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 4, at 4; Howard Mann, NAFTA and the
Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVm. L.J. 387, 405-06 (2000); David
Runnalls & Howard Mann, Still Time to Fix Flawed Trade Rule, WNNIPEG FREE PRESS, Apr.
30, 2001, at All. See also Wagner, supra note 4, at 466; Daniel R. Loritz, Comment,
CorporatePredatorsAttack Environmental Regulations:It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed
Under NAFTA's Chapter11, 22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. Rnv. 533, 554 (2000).
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"offensive" weapon 8 that has "chilled" 9 the exercise of regulatory
authority and caused an "alarming" loss of sovereignty.' 0
To counteract this perceived threat, writers have proposed a
retreat from liberal access to investor-state arbitration, 11 adoption of
binding interpretive statements to limit the substantive obligations of
Chapter 11,1 or establishment of a permanent appellate body to
review decisions of Chapter 11 tribunals. 13 The governments of
Canada and Mexico, having suffered the imposition of liability in
three Chapter 11 disputes, recently contrived a more potent device for
the restoration of national sovereignty: de novo (or at least
heightened) review of awards in annulment proceedings conducted by
municipal courts at the seat of arbitration.14 If successfully deployed,
8. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 4, at 5; Mann, supra note 7, at 405; Ferguson,
supra note 4, at 503; Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-StateDispute Mechanism (ISDM)
and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 153
(1999); Runnalls & Mann, supra note 7, at Al1; Stokes, supra note 3, at 5.
9. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of
Bryan Schwartz) at para. 203, http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm; Mann, supra note
7, at 406; Justin Byrne, Note, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based
Diplomacy Through DirectAccess, 35 TEX. INT'L L. J. 415, 432 (2000); Ferguson, supra note
4, at 500; Ganguly, supra note 8, at 119; Loritz, supra note 7, at 546. See also Rainer Geiger,
Towards a MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 467, 471 (1998)
(observing that "[e]nvironmental organizations are concerned about a chilling effect on
governmental protection of the environment, resulting from investor claims that
environmental regulation amounts to expropriation").
10. Ganguly, supra note 8, at 126. See also S.D. Myers at paras. 12, 86; Banks, supra
note 4, at 499 (1999); David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protectionand Investor
Rights Under Chapter11 of NAFTA, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 10646 (June 2001), availableat WL
31 ELR 10646; Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of International Trade DisputesChallenges to Sovereignty-A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121, 123, 134
(1998); Pierre Sauve, Canada, Free Trade, and the Diminishing Returns of Hemispheric
Regionalism, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 244 (1999-2000); Julie A. Soloway,
Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives Controversy, 8
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55, 88 (1999); Byrne, supra note 9, at 430; Loritz, supra note 7, at
546-47.
11. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 4, at 57; Herman, supra note 10, at 135-37;
Wagner, supra note 4, at 467-68; Ferguson, supra note 4, at 518-19; Ganguly, supra note 8,
at 166.
12. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 4, at 7-8, 19-20, 36, 47-48; Gantz, supra note
10; Herman, supra note 10, at 136; Julie Soloway, NAFTA "sChapter 11: The Challenge of
Private Party Participation,16 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 14 (1999); Ferguson, supra note 4, at 51718.
13. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven:
Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 303, 308 (2000); William S. Dodge, InternationalDecision, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 186, 191-92 (2001).
14. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument (Feb. 5, 2001), In re Arbitration Pursuant to
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & United Mexican States (B.C. Sup.
Ct. 2001) [hereinafter Mexico's Outline of Argument] (on file with author); Outline of
Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada (Feb. 16, 2001), In re Arbitration
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this instrument would essentially give courts in Canada, Mexico, and
the United States the final authority to interpret and apply Chapter
SlI's substantive obligations.
Presiding over a recent annulment action, the Supreme Court
of British Columbia seems to have rejected in theory-but accepted in
practice-the judicial role advocated by Canada and Mexico.' 5 The
Federal Court of Canada will soon have to address similar arguments
made by Canada in another annulment proceeding. 16 Before long, the
same issues may reach Canada's appellate courts and the courts of the
United States, which is the seat of a number of investor-state
arbitrations under Chapter 11.17 In short, North American courts face
an onslaught of litigation requiring consideration of the proper
judicial role in annulment proceedings relating to Chapter 11 awards.
This article analyzes the propriety of heightened judicial
review of Chapter 11 awards and concludes that such review
constitutes an independent violation of Chapter 11.
Although
heightened review might not, for technical and political reasons,
subject the NAFTA Parties to additional claims for liability, it
undermines the principle of voluntary compliance with authoritative
decisions rendered at the international level by impartial bodies
charged with the supervision of treaty compliance. Thus, heightened
review impairs the development of the rule of law in international
economic relations. To provide a framework for this discussion, Part
H reviews the purpose and structure of Chapter 11, including its
Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & United Mexican States
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) [hereinafter Canada's Outline of Argument], available at
http:llWww.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/canada-submission-e.pdf"
A Canadian press report
suggests that these events mark an "escalation" of attempts by NAFTA Parties to limit the
use of Chapter 11. Canada Wins Right to Contest NAFTA Suit, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 17,
2001, at B5.
15. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, United Mexican States v.
Metaiclad Corp. (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/trans-2may.pdf.
16. See Notice of Application (Feb. 8, 2001), In re Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA Between S.D. Myers, Inc. & Gov't of Canada, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/nafta-e.asp [hereinafter SD Myers Notice ofApplication].
17. Publicly available documents confirm that at least three Chapter 11 arbitrations
currently have their seats in the United States. See ADF Group, Inc. v. United States,
Procedural Order No. 2 Concerning the Place of Arbitration (July 11, 2001) at para. 22,
http:/wwvw.naftaclaims.com; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae" (Jan. 15, 2001) at para. 53,
http://www.naftaclaims.com; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of
Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5, 2001) at par. 19,
http://wwv.naftaclaims.com. The author believes that additional Chapter 11 arbitrations
have their seat in the United States, but cannot confirm this through publicly available
documents.
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provisions on judicial supervision of arbitral awards. Part III
introduces Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, which presented the first
opportunity for Mexico and Canada to request heightened judicial
review of a Chapter 11 award. Part IV criticizes the arguments of
Mexico and Canada, as well as the partial annulment of the Metalclad
award by the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Specifically, Part
IV(A) argues that the NAFTA Parties intended to place Chapter 11
disputes within the basic legal framework for international
commercial arbitration, which does not contemplate extensive review
of awards. Part IV(B) explains that a good-faith interpretation of
Chapter 11 's architecture does not permit extensive review of the
merits by municipal courts.
Finally, Part V addresses the
consequences of heightened judicial review in violation of Chapter
11, both for the NAFTA Parties and for the development of
international economic law.
II.

PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER 11

In ratifying NAFTA, Canada, Mexico and the United States
resolved to "ensure a predictable commercial framework for business
planning and investment," 18 "increase substantially investment
opportunities in the[ir] territories," 19 and "create effective procedures
for.., the resolution of disputes." 20 Chapter 11 implements these
objectives by identifying the standards for treatment of investors
and
21
establishing procedures for arbitration of investor-state disputes.
For example, Section A of Chapter 11 permits expropriation
and measures tantamount to expropriation only for a public purpose,
on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law
and the minimum standard of treatment under Chapter 11, and upon
prompt payment of fair market value (plus interest) in freelytransferable funds.22 In addition, Section A prohibits certain
performance requirements, including requirements to export a given
level or percentage of goods or services, or to achieve a given level or
percentage of domestic content.23 Furthermore, Section A requires
NAFTA Parties to treat each others' investors in accordance with the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

NAFTA, supra note 2, at 297.
Id.art. 102(1)(c), at 297.
Id.art. 102(1)(e), at 297.
Brower, supra note 4, at 3.
See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 11 10(1)-(6), at 641-42.
See id. art. 1106(1)(a)-(b), 1106(3)(b), at 640.
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relative standards of national treatment and most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment. 24 Finally, Section A establishes a minimum
standard of treatment, which mandates treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment.2 5
Section B of Chapter 11 secures these obligations by
"establish[ing] a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes
that assures both equal treatment among investors of the Parties...
and due process before an impartial tribunal. '26 To this end, the
NAFTA Parties have consented to investor-state arbitration in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Section B. 27 Their
consent represents a standing offer,28 which investors may accept by
submitting disputes to arbitration under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States (the "ICSID Convention") 29 (if the investor's home state
and the disputing NAFTA Party are both states parties to that
convention),30 the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID (if either the
investor's home state or the disputing NAFTA Party is a state party to
the ICSID Convention), or the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules. 3 1 Article
1122(2) recognizes that, when taken together, the treaty-based
consent of NAFTA Parties and the submission of claims by investors
satisfy the requirements for written arbitration agreements under the

24. See id. arts. 1102, 1103, at 639.
25. See id.art. 1105(1), at 639. Because Article 1105(1) creates a "minimum standard"
for all treatment of investments, its express incorporation by reference into Article 1110
seems unnecessary. The overlap between many substantive provisions of Chapter 11 seems
to reflect a belt-and-suspenders approach to investor protection.
26. Id.art.1115,at642.
27. See id. art. 1122(1),at644.
28. Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at para. 224; J. Christopher Thomas,
Investor-StateArbitration UnderNAFTA Chapter11, 1999 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 113. Mr.
Thomas has served as counsel to Mexico in at least three Chapter 11 proceedings, including
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States.
29. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. See NAFTA,
supra note 2, art. 1139, at 647. Presently, the United States is a state party to the ICSID
Convention, but Canada and Mexico are not. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Decision Regarding
the Place of Arbitration (Nov. 28, 1997), reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 702, 703 n.5 (1999).
30. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1120(1), at 643.
31. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 17 at Ch. V, Sect. C, U.N. Doe. A/31/17 (1976). See NAFTA, supra note 2,
art. 1120(1), at 643.
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ICSID Convention, the
New York Convention, 32 and the Inter33
American Convention.
Following submission of a claim, the arbitration rules selected
by the investor govern the proceedings except to the extent modified
by Section B of Chapter 11.34 Section B modifies the arbitration rules
by creating a limited right of audience for non-disputing NAFTA
Parties, identifying the proper law for Chapter 11 disputes, and
imposing strict limits on the form of interim and final relief that
Chapter 11 tribunals may award. Thus, Articles 1127 and 1129 entitle
non-disputing NAFTA Parties to receive copies of all pleadings,
evidence and written arguments. 35 Article 1128 also grants nondisputing NAFTA Parties the right to make submissions to Chapter 11
tribunals regarding the interpretation of NAFTA.3 6 Article 1131(1)
requires tribunals to render decisions in accordance with NAFTA and
other "applicable rules of international law." 37 Tribunals must also
apply interpretations of NAFTA made by the Free Trade Commission
(i.e., the three NAFTA Parties acting in concert through cabinet-level
representatives). 38 Although tribunals may order interim relief to
preserve their own jurisdiction and the rights of the parties, they
cannot order attachments or enjoin the application of the measures
alleged to constitute a breach of Section A.39 In their final awards,
tribunals may only grant compensatory damages plus interest,
restitution of property (subject to the NAFTA Party's right to pay
40
monetary damages in lieu of restitution), and the costs of arbitration.

32. The "New York Convention" means the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1139, at 647.
33. The "Inter-American Convention" means the Inter-American Convention on
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448 (1990), O.A.S. Treaty Series no. 42,
reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975). See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1139, at 647.
34. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1120(2), at 643.
35. See id. arts. 1127, 1129, at 645.
36. See id. art. 1128, at 645.
37. Id.art. 1131(1), at 645.
38. See id. art. 1131(2), at 645.
39. See id.art. 1134, at 646; Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Ruling by Tribunal on
Claimants' Motion for Interim Measures (Jan. 7, 2000), http://www.appletonlaw.com/
4b3P&T.htm; Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 16 ARB. INT'L 393, 416 (2000); Brower, supra note 4; Richard G. Dearden,
Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes Between an Investor and the State Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 113, 127 (Feb. 1995); Thomas, supra
note 28, at 122.
40. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1135(1), at 646. Chapter 11 tribunals cannot order
NAFTA Parties to pay punitive damages. Id.art. 1135(3), at 646.
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With respect to the binding effect, judicial supervision and
enforcement of Chapter 11 awards, Article 1136 establishes four
principles. First, awards "have no binding force except between the
disputing parties and in respect of the particular case." 41 Second,
prevailing parties may not seek enforcement of awards rendered under
the Additional Facility or UNCITRAL Rules until either (1) three
months have passed without the losing party having initiated a
proceeding to revise, set aside, or annul the award, or (2) a court has
dismissed or allowed such a proceeding and there is no further
appeal. 42 This provision, by implication, recognizes the right of
losing parties to seek revision or annulment of Chapter 11 awards by
municipal courts at the seat of arbitration.43 Third, investors may
seek enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention, the New
York Convention, or the Inter-American Convention. 44 For the
purposes of the New York Convention and the Inter-American
Convention, Chapter 11 proceedings "shall be considered to arise out
of a commercial relationship." 45 Fourth, if a NAFTA Party fails to
comply with the final award of a Chapter 11 tribunal, the investor's
home state may request the formation of a dispute resolution panel
under the state-to-state remedial provisions of Chapter 20.46 In So
doing, the complaining NAFTA Party may seek (1) a determination
that the failure to comply with the award is "inconsistent with" the
responding NAFTA Party's obligations, and (2) a recommendation
that the responding NAFTA Party comply with the award. 47

III.

THE EMPmE STRIKES BACK

In responding to the first wave of Chapter 11 claims, the
NAFTA Parties enjoyed considerable success in fending off liability.
Thus, in two cases, tribunals rendered final or partial-final awards
against the investors. 48 In a third case, a tribunal dismissed the claim
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. art. 1136(l), at 646 (emphasis added).
See id.art. 1136(3), at 646.
Alvarez, supra note 39, at 418; Thomas, supranote 28, at 109 & n.34.
See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1136(6), at 646.
Id. art. 1136(7), at 646.

46. See id. art. 1136(5),at 646.
47. See id.
48. See Azinian v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (1999), at paras.
93-124, availableat http://vww.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm (denying a claim that
Mexico violated Article 1110 (expropriation) and also finding proprio motu that Mexico
complied with its obligations under Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment)); Pope &
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on jurisdictional grounds. 49 Three more cases ended either in the
abandonment or settlement of claims for relatively modest amounts.50
More recently, however, Chapter 11 tribunals sitting in Canada issued
final or partial-final awards against the respondents in Metalclad
51 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,52 and
Corp. v. Mexico,
Pope & Talbot,
53

Inc. v. Canada.

In Metalclad, local authorities in Guadalcazar, Mexico denied
a construction permit for the investor's hazardous waste facility, even
though the competent federal authorities had already granted all
necessary environmental approvals. 54 In reaching their decision, the
local authorities gave the investor no notice, provided no opportunity
to be heard, and identified no construction defects in the facility. 5s
Later, the outgoing governor of the State of San Luis Potosi decreed
the site to be part of an ecological preserve. 5 6 The tribunal
unanimously held that these two actions permanently barred operation

Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000) at paras. 64-80, 96-105,
http://www.appletonlaw.com/ 4b3P&T.htm (denying claims that Canadian export regulations
violated Articles 1106 (performance requirements) and 1110 (expropriation)).
In a subsequent award, the Pope & Talbot tribunal also denied numerous claims that
Canadian export regulations violated Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1105 (minimum
standard of treatment). Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10,
2000) at paras. 83-104, 119-55, 182-85, http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
Although the tribunal found that the Canadian government violated Article 1105 by
conducting a vindictive audit procedure during the arbitration proceedings, see id. at paras.
156-81, the Canadian government "welcomed" the award as a "decisive[]" and "overall"
victory. See Dep't of Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade, News Release: Canada Wins NAFTA
Chapter 11 Dispute (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/
Publication.asp?FileSpec=/MinPubDocs/104070.htm.
See also Gantz, supra note 10,
(describing the violation of Article 1105 as "relatively minor[] and peripheral").
49. See Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2
(2000), availableat http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
50. See Brower, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing the settlement of Ethyl Corporation's
$251 million claim against Canada for $13 million); Soloway, supra note 12, at 12
(indicating that two investors did not pursue their Chapter 11 claims).
51. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),
availableat http://www. pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
52. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of
Bryan Schwartz), http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
53. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2. As noted above, the Pope &
Talbot tribunal ruled in Canada's favor on virtually all points, but found one minor violation
of Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment) relating to Canada's behavior during the
pendency of the arbitration.
54. Metalclad v. Mexico at paras. 52, 78, 80, 85-90.
55. Id.atpara.91.
56. Id. atparas. 109-10.
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of the facility and, therefore, constituted an indirect 57
expropriation and
a measure tantamount to expropriation, respectively.
The investor claimed that the actions of local authorities in
Guadalcazar also violated Article 1105, which requires NAFTA
Parties to treat each others' investors in accordance with
"international law," including "fair and equitable treatment."
Attempts to interpret these two phrases have generated considerable
debate. Construed according to its ordinary meaning, the phrase
"international law" refers to all sources of international law, including
treaty obligations. 58 According to this view, Article 1105 would
permit NAFTA investors to file claims against NAFTA Parties based
inter alia on the adoption or maintenance of measures that (1) relate
to investors of other NAFTA Parties (or their investments), (2) cause
loss or damage to those investors (or their investments), and (3)
59
violate a treaty obligation owed to the investors or their home states.

57. Id. at paras. 107, 109, 111.
58. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (identifying the sources of international law);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987)
(stating that "international law" includes rules established by "customary law," "international
agreement," or "general principles common to the major legal systems of the world"). See
also Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some
Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REv. 311, 314 n.10 (2000) (suggesting that the phrase "international law" refers to
treaty text, customary international law, and general principles of law); Giorgio Sacerdoti,
Bilateral Treaties and MultilateralInstruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUBIL DES
COURS 251, 344 (1997) (quoting Article 10 of the Energy Charter Treaty, which requires
treatment in accordance with "international law, including treaty obligations").
In construing Article 1131(1) (governing law), Mexico's counsel in the Metalclad
annulment proceedings claims that the phrase "international law" embraces all sources of
international law, including treaties, customary international law, general principles of law, as
well as municipal judicial decisions and writings of the most highly qualified publicists. See
Thomas, supra note 28, at 106. He offers no reason to believe that the same words might
bear a different meaning in the context of Article 1105.
59. See Pearce & Coe, supra note 58, at 314 n.10 (2000) (arguing that the phrase
"international law" refers inter alia to treaty text); see also Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty by
Subtraction: The MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491, 502,
562-63 & n.498 (1998) (describing the use of similar language in the draft Multilateral
Agreement on Investment and suggesting that it could incorporate the obligations of WTO
agreements).
Others reach a similar result by using external treaty provisions to inform the
requirements of "fair and equitable treatment." See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial
Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz) at para. 264,
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm; Brower, supra note 4, at 13; see Dodge, supra
note 13; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITuTIONS
472-73 (1995) (stating, in the context of international investment law, that treaty violations
clearly constitute actionable violations of fairness); Sacerdoti, supra note 58, at 341 n.143,
344 n.150 (defining "fair and equitable treatment" to include "respect for international law").
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Others take the position that the phrase "international law" only refers
to customary international law. 6° According to certain proponents of
this view, Article 1105(1) only prohibits host states from engaging in
egregious, outrageous or shocking conduct. 61 In a recent article, a
sitting Chapter 11 arbitrator offers a third understanding of Article
1105, which would require compliance with customary international
law plus the provisions
of NAFTA to the extent that they provide
62
protection.
additional
Attempts to define "fair and equitable treatment" have
encountered similar difficulties. Although the phrase has become a

Even if Article 1105 only incorporates customary international law, one could still
reach a similar conclusion because the breach of treaty obligations, especially by municipal
courts, may constitute a "denial of justice" under customary international law. See Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 158 (Feb. 5, 1970) (separate
opinion of Judge Tanaka) (explaining that the "judgment of a municipal court which gives
rise to the responsibility of a State by a denial of justice does have an international character
when, for instance, a court, having occasion to apply some rule of international law, gives an
incorrect interpretation of that law or applies a rule of domestic law which is itself contrary to
international law"); see also Eduardo Jimdnez de Ardchaga, InternationalLaw in the Past
Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 278-79 (1978) (indicating that municipal
court decisions that are "clearly incompatible with a rule of international law" may attract
liability under the law of state responsibility).
60. See Miximo Romero Jimdnez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 243, 244 (2001); Price, supra note 4, at 111; see also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,
UNITED STATES INvESTMENT TREATIES 78 (1992) (interpreting similar language in BITs as
"serv[ing] simply to incorporate customary international law by reference").
One should, however, take great care in reading commentary on this issue.
Although two writers indicate that the phrase "international law" incorporates "customary"
principles or standards "of international law [that] exist external to the treaty," they do not
say that the phrase incorporates "principles or standards of customary international law." See
K. Scott Gudgeon, United States BilateralInvestment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin,
Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 105, 124 (1986);
Gloria Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapterand ForeignDirect Investment in Mexico:
A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 311 (1994). The difference in
word order may be highly significant because one of those authors (a former Assistant Legal
Adviser with responsibility for the U.S. BIT program) specifically notes that the "customary
standards of international law" include all of the "usual sources of international law"
described in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Gudgeon, supra,
at 124 n.70. As explained above, Article 38 identifies treaties, customary law, and general
principles of law as the usual sources of international law. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
61. See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at
paras. 108-09, 118 (recounting Canada's arguments to this effect); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 527-28 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that "the treatment
of an alien in order to constitute an international delinquency should amount to an outrage").
As noted above, however, this limited understanding of customary international law seems
dubious at best because the violation of a treaty by municipal authorities may constitute a
"denial ofjustice" under customary international law. See supra note 59.
62. Gantz, supra note 10.
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familiar term in bilateral investment treaties (BITs),63 virtually no
case law addressed its meaning before the advent of Chapter 11
disputes. 64 Furthermore, the thin commentary on "fair and equitable
treatment" has yet to produce a consistent theme. Some authorities
indicate that the term prohibits discriminatory and arbitrary
treatment.65 Other writers suggest that fairness in the context of
international investment law forbids the unconscionable frustration of
reasonable expectations, for example by breaching treaty
obligations.66 Construing the phrase even more expansively, one
highly respected writer (Dr. F.A. Mann) states that unfair and
inequitable treatment may include measures that "are not plainly
illegal in the accepted sense of international law." 67 Because fair and
equitable treatment would be "distinct . . . from . . . principles of
international law," 68 this view might suggest an open-ended mandate
69
to second-guess the governmental decisions of NAFTA Parties.

63. See PETER MucHLINsKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 625 (1995);
Mohamed I. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in BilateralInvestment Treaties, in
IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 221, 233 (1993); F.A.
Mann, British Treatiesfor the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 241, 243; Report to the Development Committee on the Legal Frameworkfor the
Treatment ofForeignInvestments, 31 I.L.M. 1368, 1373 (1992); Sacerdoti, supra note 58, at
345; K.P. Sauvant & V. Aranda, The International Legal Frameworkfor Transnational
Corporations,in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 83, 96 (A.A. Fatouros ed., 1994); John A.
Westberg & Bertrand P. Marchais, General Principles Governing Foreign Investment as
Articulated in Recent InternationalTribunalAwards and Writings ofPublicists, in SHIHATA,
supra,at 337, 353.
64. Mann, supra note 63, at 243; Westberg & Marchais, supra note 63, at 353. Two
writers assert that the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal addressed the standard of "fair and
equitable treatment" in Rankin v. Iran, 17 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRm. REP. 135 (1987). See
Westberg & Marchais, supra note 63, at 353-54. The conclusion seems dubious.
65. See Edward A. Laing, Equal Access/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate
Discriminationin InternationalEconomic Law, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 246, 286 n.201 (1996);
A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of NonDiscriminationin InternationalLaw of Foreign Investment, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 57,
76 (1998) (quoting MUCHLINSKI, supra note 63, at 625); Sandrino, supra note 60, at 311.
66. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 473. See also Sacerdoti, supra note 58, at 341 n.143
(construing "fair and equitable treatment" to require "respect for international law"); cf
Brower, supra note 4, at 8 (suggesting that the claimant in Methanex Corp. v. United States
had attempted to use "fair and equitable treatment" to incorporate WTO norms).
67. Mann, supra note 63, at 243. See also VANDEVELDE, supra note 60, at 76
(suggesting that the obligation of "fair and equitable treatment" covers situations "where
other substantive provisions of international and national law provide no protection").
68. Gudgeon, supra note 60, at 125. See also Mann, supra note 63, at 244.
69. In its latest award, the Pope & Talbot tribunal adopted Dr. Mann's definition of
"fair and equitable treatment," but declined "to substitute its judgment... for Canada's" and
denied almost all challenges to Canadian export regulations because they represented a
"reasonable response to the circumstances." See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the
Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at paras. 121, 123, 125, 128, 155, 185. This suggests that
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These debates about the interpretation of "international law"
and "fair and equitable treatment" border on the absurd, albeit for
different reasons.
Because "international law" has a clearly
established meaning, 70 current disagreements about the scope of that
phrase reflect an attempt to create ambiguity where none exists.
Conversely, the debates about "fair and equitable treatment"
constitute a futile effort to reduce a general concept to a precise
statement of legal obligation. Proponents of this effort seem oblivious
to the fact that the inclusion of "fair and equitable treatment" in
Article 1105(1) represents the exemplification of an intentionally
vague term, designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority
to articulate a variety of rules necessary
to achieve the treaty's object
71
and purpose in particular disputes.
Dr. Mann's views do not necessarily invite open-ended scrutiny of measures adopted or
maintained by host states.
70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71. When treaty drafters intentionally use ambiguous phrases to gloss over differences,
they effectively grant the competent judicial body a quasi-legislative power to formulate
specific rules of conduct. See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 495 (3d ed.
1957). The phrase "fair and equitable treatment" evidently falls within this category of treaty
provisions. See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (3d ed. 1998) ("When
an arbitrator is asked by the parties to have regard to equitable considerations.., he...
begins to assume the role of a legislator, creating law for the case in hand."); UNITED
NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 41
(1988) ("It is in the nature of a very general concept like fair and equitable treatment that
there can be no precise definition. What is fair and what is equitable may largely be a matter
of interpretation in each individual case."); VANDEVELDE, supra note 60, at 76 ("The phrase
is vague and its precise content will have to be defined over time through treaty practice,
including perhaps arbitration under the disputes provisions."); see also C. WILFRED JENKS,
THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 426, 767 (1964) (explaining that
"equity... is... largely a matter of adapting principles to circumstances," and arguing that
"equitable concepts... should play an important part in adapting principles to circumstances
in a world in which the law is constantly confronted with new problems and new needs").
In July 2001, the Free Trade Commission (i.e., cabinet-level representatives of the
NAFTA Parties) adopted the first Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions,
which purport inter alia to make the following three interpretations of Article 1105(1). See
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, § B, at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp. First, the Notes of Interpretation
provide that "Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment as the minimum standard of treatment" required by Chapter 11. Id. § B(l)
(emphasis added). Second, "[t]he concept[] of 'fair and equitable treatment' . . . do[es] not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens." Id. § B(2). Third, "[a]
determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article
1105(1)." Id. § B(3).
The NAFTA Parties state that the Notes of Interpretation "clarify" the meaning of
Article 1105(1) and indicate that the Notes of Interpretation bind all sitting and future
Chapter 11 tribunals. See id., Preamble (stating that the Notes of Interpretation "clarify"
Article 1105); NAFTA Trade Ministers Clarijy Chapter 11 Investment Provision, 18 INT'L
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Consistent with the author's understanding of the provision, it
should come as no surprise that, in deciding the investor's claim
under Article 1105, the Metalcladtribunal made no explicit attempt to
define unfair and inequitable treatment. At the outset of its decision,
however, it held that the investment did not receive "fair and
equitable treatment in accordance with international law.' 72 By
(BNA) 1234 (Aug. 2, 2001) (indicating that the U.S. Trade Representative
expects the Notes of Interpretation to "apply to all future and pending cases"). The Notes of
Interpretation, however, resolve few (if any) debates about the meaning of Article 1105(1).
Without trying to undertake a comprehensive analysis, one should immediately perceive three
facts that will prevent the Notes of Interpretation from settling existing disagreements. First,
it is not clear that the Notes of Interpretation have any binding force. While Article 1131(2)
authorizes cabinet-level representatives to adopt binding "interpretations" of NAFTA's
provisions, Article 2202 governs "amendments" of NAFTA's provisions. According to
Article 2202, the NAFTA Parties may agree on any "modification of or addition to" NAFTA,
but such amendments become "an integral part" of NAFTA only upon approval by the
NAFTA Parties "in accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each Party." In other
words, NAFTA draws a fundamental distinction between interpretation and
modification: cabinet-level officials have the authority to resolve ambiguities, but not the
power to modify obligations without submitting the proposed text for domestic political
approval. If, as the author believes, the Free Trade Commission's purported "interpretation"
of Article 1105 actually constitutes a "modification," it represents an ultra vires, attempted
amendment that has no binding force.
Even if the Notes of Interpretation have some binding force, one must seriously
doubt the U.S. contention that they are binding on Chapter 11 tribunals in existing disputes.
Although Article 1131(2) of NAFTA does not specifically prohibit retroactive application of
interpretive statements, Article 113 1(1) requires Chapter 11 tribunals to "decide the issues in
dispute in accordance with ... applicable rules of international law." Because those rules
include the principle that "no one may be the judge of his own cause," it seems highly
unlikely that a Chapter 11 tribunal would construe Article 1131(1) as authorizing the use of
interpretive statements by NAFTA Parties to resolve substantive issues in pending disputes.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at § 102 cmt.l (identifying the rule that no one may be
judge in his own cause as a general principle that has achieved the status of international
TRADE REP.

law).
Assuming that the Notes of Interpretation constitute a binding interpretation of
Article 1105(1), NAFTA investors may still argue that Article 1103 entitles them to a level of
"fair and equitable treatment" that exceeds the requirements of customary international law.
Article 1103 requires the NAFTA Parties to give NAFTA investors and their investments
treatment no less favorable than given to investors and investments of countries that have
concluded BITs with NAFTA Parties. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1103, 32 I.L.M. at 639.
The "fair and equitable treatment" provisions of BITs, in turn, have been construed to exceed
the requirements of customary international law. See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on
the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at paras. 110-13. Thus, whatever the meaning of
Article 1105(1), NAFTA investors may use Article 1103 to bring claims based on the more
generous standards of BITs, and Chapter 11 tribunals may interpret the BITs without regard
to the Free Trade Commission's Notes of Interpretation. See id.at para. 117 (concluding that
a limited interpretation of Article 1105 would not prevent claims for the denial of "fair and
equitable treatment" under the broader interpretations of BITs); see also NAFTA, supra note
2, art. 1131(2), 32 I.L.M. at 645 (authorizing the Free Trade Commission to make binding
interpretations only "of this Agreement").
72. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),
availableat http://wvw. pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html at para. 74.
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linking "fair and equitable treatment" to the requirements of
"international law," the tribunal avoided the potentially open-ended
construction favored by Dr. Mann. Instead, the tribunal took an
approach that requires an assessment of fairness and equity in relation
to a fixed reference
point, namely the obligations created by
73
law.
international
The tribunal therefore turned its attention to the principles
established by NAFTA. Prominent among these, the tribunal found
several references to transparency. 74 The tribunal noted that the
NAFTA Parties agreed to "ensure a predictable commercial
framework for business planning and investment" and to "ensure that
[their] laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings... are
promptly.., made available in such a manner as to enable interested
persons.., to become acquainted with them." 75 From these
principles, the tribunal concluded that NAFTA Parties have the
obligation to make sure that all legal requirements affecting
investment are capable of being readily known.7 6 According to the
tribunal, "[t]here should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such
matters." 77 Once a NAFTA Party "become[s] aware of any scope for
misunderstanding or confusion," it must "ensure78 that the correct
position is promptly determined and clearly stated."
In the tribunal's view, Mexico violated these obligations by
neglecting to establish clear rules on the need for-or procedures for
obtaining-local construction permits. 79 In addition, the failure of
73. In other words, one may distinguish between a mandate to decide cases based on
"principles of international law, justice and equity" and mandates to decide cases "' in
accordance with the principles ofjustice and equity' without reference to international law or
even 'upon a basis of absolute equity."' JENKS, supra note 71, at 335. In the first situation,
the tribunal may "take equitable considerations into account in finding the law." MANLEY 0.
HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 530 (1934). In the latter
situations, the tribunal need not consider the limitations of existing law and may render
decisions that directly contradict existing law. See id. at 530-31.
74. Metalclad v. Mexico at par. 76.
75. Id. at para. 71 (quoting the Preamble to and Article 1802(1) of NAFTA,
respectively).
76. Id.at para. 76.
77. See id.
78. Id. This holding is consistent with a highly respected academic writer's conclusion
that "fair and equitable treatment" requires "all rules and practices affecting an investor's
interest [to] be transparent[] [and] predictable." See Sacerdoti, supra note 58, at 344 n.150;
see also Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. RaV. 421, 423-24 (2001) (concluding that "fair and equitable treatment"
requires host states to deal "transparently in their relations with foreigners").
79. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),
availableat http://www. pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html at para. 88.
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Guadalcazar's authorities to give the investor notice of a town
meeting that resulted in the denial of its request for a construction
permit, to provide an opportunity to be heard, or to identify any
relevant considerations for the denying the permit demonstrated the
lack of a transparent or predictable framework for business planning
and investment.80 Having identified three breaches of Chapter 11,
however, the tribunal only awarded $16,685,000 (plus post-award
interest), representing
a modest fraction of the investor's
81
$115,000,000 claim.
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, a different tribunal
unanimously held that Canada violated Article 1102 (national
treatment) by prohibiting the export of PCBs and PCB wastes to the
United States for remediation. 8Z According to the tribunal, Canada
adopted the export ban not to protect public safety or the
environment, but to shelter its own PCB-remediation industry from
U.S. competition. 83 A majority of the tribunal also ruled that this
denial of national treatment violated the investor's right to fair and
equitable treatment. 84 In so doing, the S.D. Myers tribunal adopted an
analysis similar to-but more explicitly deferential to NAFTA Parties
than-the reasoning employed by the Metalclad tribunal. For
example, the S.D. Myers tribunal specifically recognized the absence
of an "open-ended mandate to second-guess" the controversial policy
choices of NAFTA Parties. 85 Furthermore, it construed the phrase
"fair and equitable treatment" in conjunction with the words "in
accordance with international law.",86 Interpreted this way, Article
1105 only prohibits unjust or arbitrary treatment that is "unacceptable
from the international perspective." 87
Finally, the tribunal
acknowledged its obligation to consider the "high measure of
deference that international law generally extends to 88. ..domestic
authorities to regulate matters within their ...borders."
80. Id. atparas. 91-93, 99.
81. Id. atparas. 114-15, 131.
82. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of
Bryan Schwartz) at paras. 238-57, http://ww.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm. PCB stands
for "polychlorinated biphenyl," and refers to a family of highly toxic compounds.
83. Id. atparas. 194-95.
84. Id. at paras. 258-69.
85. Id. at para. 261.
86. Id. at para. 262.
87. Id. at para. 263.
88. Id. Put more simply, it appears that the tribunal would generally consider a
violation of international investment law to constitute a sufficient (but not necessary)
showing of unfair and inequitable treatment. This leaves open the possibility that state
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Notwithstanding this explicitly deferential framework, a
majority of the tribunal observed that claimants can generally
establish unfair and inequitable treatment by demonstrating the breach
of a rule of international law specifically designed to protect
investors. 89 Hence, the majority's ruling that Canada's violation of
Article 1102 (national treatment) established a denial of fair and
equitable treatment. 90 In a separate opinion, one member of the
majority indicated that Canada might also have violated Article 1105
by failing to give the investor notice of the proposal to ban exports of
PCBs, granting its Canadian competitors privileged access to
decision-makers,
and not responding to the investor's
communications regarding the ban. 91 According to this separate
opinion, Canada's actions seemed incompatible with principles of
procedural fairness and transparency established by Article 1802 of
NAFTA and other widely accepted treaties, including the WTO
agreements and BITs. 92 The separate opinion declined, however, to
make a conclusive determination regarding additional 93violations
because the pleadings did not specifically address the issue.
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the investor challenged
Canadian regulations requiring permits for-and payment of fees
on-certain softwood lumber exports to the United States. According
to the investor, the regulations constituted a performance
requirement, 94 a measure tantamount to expropriation, 95 and a denial
of national treatment and fair and equitable treatment.96 Although the
conduct might be "unacceptable from the international perspective" without violating
international law. For example, a technically proper, but abusive, exercise of treaty rights
might constitute unfair and inequitable treatment. See Price, supra note 78, at 423-24 (2001)
(indicating that "fair and equitable" treatment requires adherence to the principle of good
faith).
89. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of
Bryan Schwartz) at para. 264, http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
90. See id. at para. 266. Several publicists agree that "fair and equitable treatment"
incorporates the more specific rule of nondiscrimination (i.e., national treatment). See
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 63, at 625; Laing, supra note 65, at 286 n.201 (1996); Sacerdoti,
supra note 58, at 344 n.150, 346; Sandrino, supra note 60, at 311.
91. Id. (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz) at paras. 241, 246-47, 252.
92. Id. at paras. 249-50, 253-55, 257.
93. Id. at paras. 253,258.
94. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Statement of Claim Under the Arbitration Rules
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the North American Free
Trade Agreement at 22-23, http://www.appletonlaw.com! 4b3P&T.htm.
95. See id. at 23-27.
96. See id. at 20-22. Pope & Talbot initially asserted that the measures also violated
the principle of MFN treatment, but later withdrew that part of its claim. Pope & Talbot v.
Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000) at para. 14.
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tribunal rejected all challenges to the regulations per se,97 it held that
the Canadian government violated Article 1105 by initiating a
vindictive regulatory audit, in which it accused the investor of
unspecified "errors" and "discrepancies," unjustifiably hinted at
criminal misconduct, and threatened dire consequences.98 In so
doing, however, the tribunal declined to adopt either the claimant's or
Canada's definition of fair and equitable treatment, each of which
required some connection to international law. 99 Instead, the tribunal
adopted the views of Dr. Mann, 100 which it saw as more consistent
with NAFTA's goal of creating an "hospitable" investment
climate. 101
Although Canada's softwood lumber regulations
generally provided
such an environment, the "verification review
102
episode" did not.
In the wake of these developments, Mexico petitioned the
Supreme Court of British Columbia to annul the Metalclad award,
and the Attorney General of Canada intervened to support Mexico's
petition. 10 3 Canada has also requested its Federal Court to annul the
partial-final award rendered by the S.D. Myers tribunal. 104 Because
97. See id.
98. See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at
paras. 163, 166-68, 171, 173-76, 178-81.
99. According to the investor, fair and equitable treatment requires compliance with
customary international law, treaty law, general principles of law, principles of good faith,
the World Bank's guidelines on foreign direct investment, and domestic principles on the
exercise of regulatory authority. See id.at para. 109. The Canadian government, by contrast,
argued that fair and equitable treatment represents a principle of customary international law
that only prohibits "egregious" or "shocking" governmental misconduct. Id.
100. Seeid. atparas. 110-11 & 118n.5.
101. Seeid. atpara. 116.
102. Seeid. atpara. 185.
103. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14; Canada's Outline of Argument,
supra note 14.
104. See S.D. Myers Notice of Application, supra note 16. Because the S.D. Myers
tribunal rendered its award against the Canadian government, Canada's federal arbitration
statute (based on the UNCITRAL Model Law) governs the annulment proceedings. See infia
notes 107, 129-30 and accompanying text. Because this legislation defines "commercial
arbitration" to include Chapter 11 awards, the Canadian government cannot seek heightened
review on the grounds that the Chapter 11 proceedings constitute a form of noncommercial
arbitration. Nevertheless, one of Canada's attorneys in the S.D. Myers proceedings (Joseph
de Pencier) argued in the Metalclad annulment proceedings that the court could adopt a
heightened standard of review regardless of the applicable arbitration statute. See infra notes
131-34 and accompanying text. According to Mr. de Pencier, the "NAFTA architecture"
establishes that the awards of Chapter 11 tribunals "are not ... worthy of judicial deference."
See infra notes 135-42, 201 and accompanying text. He seems poised to make a similar
argument for heightened review in the S.D. Myers annulment proceedings, since the
annulment application charges the tribunal with misinterpreting the definitions of "investor of
a Party" and "investment" under Chapter 11, the phrase "in like circumstances" under Article
1102 (national treatment), and the nature of the obligations created by Article 1105

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[40:43

Article 1136(3) specifically contemplates annulment proceedings,
their initiation may be unremarkable. 10 5 Mexico and Canada have
adopted the unusual position, however, that municipal courts may
exercise de novo (or at least heightened) review of Chapter 11 awards
because they do not arise out of "commercial" relationships and,
therefore, do not benefit from the deferential legal framework that
applies to international commercial arbitration. 10 6 In addition,
Canada has argued that the "NAFTA architecture indicates that
awards of Chapter 11 tribunals . . .are not ... worthy of judicial
deference." 10 7 This represents an effort to use heightened judicial
review to reclaim control over Chapter 11 proceedings, thereby
transforming municipal courts into the final arbiters of investor-state
disputes.
According to Mexico, one of two laws must govern annulment
proceedings relating to Chapter 11 awards rendered against Mexico or
the United States by tribunals having their seat in British Columbia:
the International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA) or the
Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA). 108 The ICAA enacts the
UNCITRAL Model Law (Model Law) in British Columbia and
applies to international commercial arbitration. 10 9 Like the Model
Law, the ICAA derives its annulment provisions from Article V of the
New York Convention. 110 As a result, it does not permit judicial
(minimum standard of treatment). See S.D. Myers Notice of Application, supra note 16, at
paras. 5, 7, 9, 10.
It remains to be seen if Canada will seek annulment of the Pope & Talbot Phase-2
Award. The Canadian government might arguably see the adoption of Dr. Mann's views as
an open-ended invitation to second-guess its policy choices. See Gantz, supra note 10
(describing the Pope & Talbot ruling as "troubling," "expansive," "possibly erroneous," and
an example of "questionable legal reasoning" that "raises the most serious questions about
the future" of Chapter 11). This characterization seems inconsistent with the tribunal's
refusal to "substitute its own judgment... for Canada's" and its characterization of the
challenged measures as a "reasonable response to the circumstances." See infra note 236 and
accompanying text. Thus, Canada seems unlikely to seek annulment, although the damages
ultimately awarded for the "verification review episode" may affect its decision.
105. See Gantz, supra note 10 (claiming that "the practice of challenging adverse
decisions (S.D. Myers and Metalclad) in national courts... is understandable, given the
tendency of government lawyers, like all attorneys, to resort to all available remedies").
106. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 118-86; Canada's
Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 4-30.
107. Canada's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 25-30.
108. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at para. 118. For awards
rendered against Canada, the federal Commercial Arbitration Act would apply. See id. at
para. 144. That statute explicitly defines "commercial arbitration" to include Chapter 11
proceedings against the Canadian government. See id.
109. See id. at paras. 122, 126-27.
110. See id. atpara. 123.
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review of awards for legal error; 111 it only permits annulment for
serious defects in jurisdiction or procedure that damage the integrity
of arbitration as an institution, such as excess of jurisdiction or
insufficient notice. 112 Furthermore, courts applying the ICAA have
adopted a "powerful presumption" that the arbitrators acted within
their jurisdiction. 113 The CAA, by contrast, applies to arbitrations not
falling within the ICAA. I 14 The CAA permits review 115
for legal error,
as well as serious defects in jurisdiction and procedure.
According to Mexico, Chapter 11 arbitrations arise out of
noncommercial relationships and, therefore, fall outside of the
ICAA. 1 16 Mexico, for example, identified three characteristics that
supposedly distinguish the Metalclad dispute from international
commercial arbitration, which Mexico defined as the adjudication 117
of
private economic rights in the context of exchange transactions.
First, as an international trade agreement, the NAFTA represents
public law affecting the NAFTA Parties as sovereign states (as
opposed to private commercial law). 118
Second, Chapter 11
claimants do not exercise private commercial rights, but step into the
shoes of their home states and exercise the treaty rights of their home
states. 119 Third, in the particular dispute, Mexican authorities and the
investor stood in a relationship not between commercial equals but
"between government and the governed, between legislator and the
subject of legislation." 120 To support its views, Mexico quoted the
United States' argument in another Chapter 11 arbitration to the effect
11. See id. atpara. 172.
112. Seeid. atpara. 168.
113. See id.at paras. 177, 180. U.S. courts apply a similar presumption. See Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d
Cir. 1974); GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 708-09 (2d ed.
2001).
114. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 153-54.
115. See id. at paras. 157-59. Under the CAA, the applicant must obtain leave of the
court for appeals on questions of law. Courts have the discretion to grant leave if (a) the
importance of the result of the arbitration to the parties justifies the intervention of the court
and the determination of the point of law may prevent a miscarriage of justice, (b) the point
of law is of importance to some class or body of persons of which the applicant is a member,
or (c) the point of law is of general or public importance. See id. at paras. 158-60.
116. See id. atparas. 118-86.
117. See id. atparas. 131, 134.
118. See id.atpara. 131.
119. See id. at paras. 72-73; In re Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA
Between Metalclad Corp. & United Mexican States (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), Transcript of
Proceedings (Feb. 19, 2001) at 61, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/
NAFTA-e.asp#Metalclad.
120. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at para. 145.
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that claims involving the use of international law to challenge public
regulatory law "could not easily lend [themselves] to being
characterized as commercial. 121 Thus, according to Mexico, the
Metalclad award lay outside the ICAA's embrace and within the
scope of the CAA,
which permits de novo judicial review on
122
questions of law.
In the event that the Metalclad award fell within the scope of
the ICAA, Mexico submitted that the same considerations justified
the adoption of a heightened standard of review.123
Mexico
recognized that courts have interpreted the ICAA to create a
"powerful presumption" that "private commercial tribunals" have not
exceeded their jurisdiction because their awards "do not have any
public policy ramifications." 124 Mexico argued, however, that the
presumption does not apply to "mixed arbitration between...
investor[s] and... sovereign State[s] regarding alleged breaches of a
trilateral trade agreement" 125 because "incorrect or unreasonable
decisions .. have significant public policy ramifications" on issues
126
of general concern, including public health and the environment.
In their arguments, Mexico and Canada both acknowledged
that Article 1136(7) provides that claims "submitted to arbitration
under... Section [B] shall be considered to arise out of a commercial
relationship or transaction for purposes of . . . the New York
Convention and . . . the Inter-American Convention."12 7 Even so,
they observed that those treaties only apply to the enforcement of
awards.128 Since neither treaty governs annulment proceedings,
Article 1136(7) was not relevant. 129 Mexico further recognized that
Canada's federal arbitration statute defines "commercial arbitration"
to include Chapter 11 claims, but noted that the federal statute only
130
applies to claims brought against the Canadian government.
Because Mexico was the respondent in Metalclad, the federal law's
31
definition of "commercial arbitration" did not apply. 1
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at para. 147 (quoting U.S. submissions in Methanex Corp. v. United States).
See id. at paras. 126-28.
See id.at paras. 178-86.
See id. atparas. 180, 184-85.
See id.
at paras. 177, 179-81.
See id. at paras. 184-85.
See id. at para. 135; Canada's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at para. 16.
See id.
See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at para. 135.
See id.at para. 144.
See id.
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In its submissions as intervenor, Canada did not comment on
the law applicable to the annulment proceedings. 132 Regardless of the
applicable law, Canada urged the rejection of precedent established in
the field of "private commercial arbitration" and the adoption of a
"pragmatic and functional approach" to formulating an appropriate
standard of review. 133 Like Mexico, Canada argued that the
deferential judicial review of private commercial awards depends on
the involvement of "parties bound by contract law in narrow
commercial disputes dealing with private law issues." 134 By contrast,
the "inherently ... public nature" of Chapter 11 arbitrations justified
the development of a new standard of review. 135 Furthermore, the
of
"NAFTA architecture" supposedly establishes that the awards 136
Chapter 11 tribunals "are not... worthy of judicial deference."
For instance, the Canadian government observed that Chapter 11
tribunals "do not exhibit the features of... specialized or expert
administrative tribunal[s].' 137 Chapter 11 tribunals are appointed ad
hoc and for single cases. 138 Unlike WTO dispute resolution panels,
Chapter 11 tribunals do not enjoy the support of a permanent
secretariat. 139 In addition, tribunals must follow the Free Trade
Commission's official interpretations of Chapter 11.140 Also, Chapter
11 awards do not constitute precedent and have no binding force
beyond the particular dispute. 141 Finally, in resolving individual
disputes, Chapter 11 tribunals can award damages or restitution, but
cannot strike down or grant extraordinary relief from the impugned
measure. 142 According to Canada, these characteristics indicate that
Chapter 11 tribunals do not merit judicial deference. 143
Responding to these arguments, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia first addressed the issue of the applicable law. 144 In so
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
49.

See Canada's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at par. 4.
See id. atparas. 2, 19.
See id.atpara. 23.
See id. at paras. 5, 25.
See id.
See id.at para. 25.
See id.
See id.
See id. at para. 26.
See id.
See id. at para. 27.
See id. at para. 30.
See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note 15, at paras. 39-
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doing, it observed that the ICAA specifically permits reference to the
Model Law's commentary in order to resolve interpretive
questions. 145
That commentary, in turn, calls for a "wide
interpretation" of commercial arbitration, which it defines to include
arbitration arising out of investment relationships. 146 Although
Mexico's exercise of regulatory authority precipitated the Metalclad
dispute, the court held that it was merely incidental to the claimant's
investment relationship with Mexico. 147 To further support this
conclusion, the court noted that Chapter 11 only applies 148
to
"investment disputes," as opposed to regulatory disputes.
Consequently, Chapter 11 proceedings fall within the definition of
"commercial" arbitration and, thus, the scope of the ICAA. 14 9
The court then recognized that the ICAA permits annulment
for serious defects of procedure or jurisdiction and violations of
public policy, but not legal error.150 Although the court declined to
adopt Canada's "pragmatic and functional" approach as an
independent standard of review, the court stated that its underlying
principles might "be of assistance in applying" the ICAA. 151 Perhaps
for this reason, the court never expressly acknowledged any
obligation to apply the customarily "powerful presumption" that
arbitral tribunals have acted within their jurisdiction. 5 2 The notable
omission of this presumption from 153
the court's analysis seems to have
opened the door to de novo review.
Turning to the merits of the annulment petition, the court held
that Chapter 11 generally permits the arbitration of claims alleging
violations of Section A, but not other provisions of NAFTA. 154 With
respect to Article 1105, the court ruled that one must measure fairness
and equity by reference to customary international law, as opposed to
treaty law or any other benchmark. 155
Having adopted this
145. See id. at para. 42.
146. See id. atparas. 41, 43.
147. See id. at para. 46.
148. See id.at para. 45.
149. See id. at para. 49.
150. See id.at paras. 50-5 1.
151. See id. atpara. 54
152. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
153. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID
Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 761 (observing that the failure to give awards a
presumption of validity exposes them to de novo review in annulment proceedings).
154. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note 15, at para. 59.
155. See id. at paras. 62-65.
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interpretation of Article 1105, the court then ruled that the tribunal
exceeded its jurisdiction by grounding its determination of unjust and
in a purported violation of Article 1802
inequitable treatment
15 6
(transparency).

Although the investor credibly argued that the tribunal had
merely interpreted Article 1105 to include a minimum standard of
transparency (and therefore had not exceeded its jurisdiction to apply
Article 1105),157 the court disagreed. 158 Furthermore, while the court
mentioned the theoretical possibility of judicial deference to
arbitrators' interpretations of Article 1105,159 it observed that it would
have reached the same conclusion under a much broader
interpretation of that Article. 160 Whatever the reach of Article 1105,
the court held that it does not embrace principles of transparency;
therefore, any decision incorporating such principles constitutes an
excess of jurisdiction. 161 Additionally, although the court understood
the tribunal as having interpreted Article 102(1) to include
transparency among the "objectives" that inform all of NAFTA's
provisions, the court described the tribunal's conclusion as an
"incorrect" understanding of Article 102(1).162
Turning to the findings on expropriation, the court held that
the tribunal's excess of jurisdiction "infected" its conclusion that the
denial of the construction permit constituted an indirect
156. See id.atparas. 66-71.
157. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying "a powerful presumption" that the
tribunal acted within its powers and deferring to the tribunal's interpretation of contractual
provisions that allegedly limited its jurisdiction). Some of the most highly respected writers
(including one negotiator of Chapter 11) would agree with the tribunal's interpretation of
"fair and equitable treatment" to include the principle of transparency. See Price, supra note
78, at 424 ("The fair and equitable treatment standard is closely aligned with, and overlaps,
certain fundamental principles of international law-including transparency... from which
other, more specific legal rules emanate."); Sacerdoti, supra note 58, at 344 n.150 ("[F]air
and equitable treatment... requires that all rules and practices affecting an investor's interest
be transparent, predictable and non discriminatory. This standard refers implicitly to...
transparency of investment conditions and respect of international law.").
One might likewise have sustained the award on the grounds that the tribunal
interpreted "fair and equitable treatment" as an intentionally vague term that creates a quasilegislative authority to formulate the specific rules (such as transparency) necessary to
achieve the treaty's object and purpose in particular disputes. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
158. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note 15, at paras. 66,
68.
159. See id.at paras. 68-69.
160. See id.at para. 74.
161. See id.at paras. 72, 74.
162. See id.atpara. 71.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[40:43

expropriation. 163
Although the tribunal's first finding of
expropriation also relied on a comparison to Biloune v. Ghana Invs.
Ctr.164 (which did not involve the concept of transparency), the court
ruled that "substantial [factual] differences" rendered that case an
inappropriate precedent for equating the denial of a construction
permit with expropriation. 165 This analysis appears to represent de
novo review of the tribunal's application of precedent.
Thus, while the Supreme Court of British Columbia ultimately
upheld the tribunal's second finding of expropriation based on the
ecological decree, 166 its partial annulment of the Metalclad award
seems to rest on at least four elements of heightened review. First, the
court appears not to have applied the powerful presumption that the
tribunal acted within its jurisdiction, 16 7 which arguably could have
sustained the argument that the tribunal merely interpreted Article
1105 to include principles of transparency. Second, the court implied
that it could not accept such a broad interpretation of Article 1105
because principles of transparency do not fall within the embrace of
Chapter 11. Third, the court overruled the tribunal's interpretation of
Article 102(1), which would have included transparency among
NAFTA's animating principles. Fourth, although the court could
have sustained the tribunal's first finding of expropriation based on its
interpretation of Biloune, the court rejected its interpretation of that
case. Although the Supreme Court of British Columbia formally
eschewed the principle of heightened review,68 one may hardly
characterize its decision as a model of deference. 1

163. See id. at paras. 78-79.
164. 95 I.L.R. 183 (1990).
165. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note 15, at para. 80.
166. Seeid. atpara. 105.
167. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
168. See Questions Remain After B.C. Supreme Court Upholds Metalclad Victory in
Mexico Case: Q&A with NAFTA Legal Expert Todd Weiler, MEx. FORECAST, May 15, 2001,
at 2, 6, availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com (observing that the court paid lip service to
the principle of judicial deference, but arguing that the court actually "substituted" its own
opinions for that of the tribunal, and concluding that this example of heightened review
"should concern anyone looking to enforce an international arbitral award in British
Columbia").
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IV.

INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA
ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTENT, ARCHITECTURE, AND
HEIGHTENED REVIEW

As noted above, the arguments for heightened judicial review
of Chapter 11 awards rest on two potential foundations. First, the
allegedly noncommercial nature of the underlying relationships might
remove Chapter 11 disputes from the deferential framework that
Although the
applies to international commercial arbitration.
Supreme Court of British Columbia rejected this view, Part IV(A)
suggests that the court incorrectly based its decision on the "nature"
of Chapter 11 disputes and should, instead, have considered the intent
of the NAFTA Parties. Second, NAFTA's "architecture" might
indicate that Chapter 11 tribunals do not merit judicial deference.
Although one may detect this view in the substance (if not the
rhetoric) of the court's decision, Part IV(B) argues that Chapter 1l's
structure prohibits-and eliminates the need for-heightened judicial
review.
A.

The Role of Nature andIntent in Defining "Commercial"
Arbitration.

In characterizing Chapter 11 disputes as commercial or
noncommercial, Mexico, Canada and the Supreme Court of British
169
Columbia all examined the "nature" of the underlying relationships.
This approach assumes that the underlying relationships have
attributes that one may clearly identify as commercial or
As explained below, this assumption seems
noncommercial.
untenable because relationships between investors and host states
have both commercial and noncommercial aspects, making any
determination of their true "nature" impossible, or at least highly
subjective. Therefore, the proper inquiry should focus on the evident
the
intent of the NAFTA Parties to subject Chapter 11 proceedings to 170
deferential legal framework of international commercial arbitration.
169. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note 15, at paras. 41,
43-46; Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 129-31, 145-52; Canada's
Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 5-7.
170. See David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure ofInternationalDispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 107, 126-27
(1990) (trying to determine whether the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal fell within the
model of interstate arbitration or the model of international commercial arbitration,
recognizing that "the choice suggested as most likely by the circumstances may not be the
choice in fact adopted by the parties," and concluding that "the issue is not whether an
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In trying to establish the noncommercial character of Chapter
11 disputes, Mexico argued that the claims do not involve business
relationships but the exercise of public rights granted to sovereign
states by international agreement. 71 Thus, in making Chapter 11
claims, investors do not assert their own (private) rights, but
essentially "step into the shoes" and "assert the rights" of their home
states under international law. 172 Although Chapter 11 disputes
certainly have public policy ramifications, four juridical facts
contradict Mexico's description of Chapter 11 proceedings. First, the
initiation of Chapter 11 proceedings by investors does not preclude
their home states from simultaneously pursuing claims under the
state-to-state remedial provisions of Chapter 20.173 If NAFTA
investors merely stepped into the shoes of their host states, it seems
unlikely that NAFTA would tolerate such parallel proceedings.
Second, Chapter 11 and Chapter 20 establish different rules 176
of
procedure,' 74 numbers of panelists, 7 5 qualifications of panelists,
procedures for rendering decisions,177 and methods of enforcing
decisions. 17 8Thus, whereas Chapter 11 disputes follow the template
arbitration has [an interstate or commercial] character," but whether "the parties intended"
disputes to fall within the model of commercial arbitration).
171. See Mexico's Outline of Argument supra note 14, at para. 131.
172. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 119, at 61.
173. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1115, at 642 (stating that the investor-state
arbitration procedures established by Section B do not "prejudice... the rights and
obligations of the [NAFTA] Parties under Chapter Twenty"). See also Thomas, supra note
28, at 105 n.21.
174. Compare NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1120, at 643 (permitting the submission of
investor-state disputes to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility
Rules of ICSID, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as modified by Section B of Chapter
11), with art. 2012(1)-(2), at 696 (requiring the Free Trade Commission to adopt Model Rules
of Procedure for state-to-state disputes).
175. Compare NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1123, at 644 (providing for investor-state
arbitration before panels of three arbitrators), with art. 2011(1)-(2), at 696 (requiring panels of
five individuals for state-to-state disputes).
176. Compare id., art. 1124(3)-(4), at 644 (indicating that, if the parties cannot agree on a
presiding arbitrator in investor-state arbitration, the Secretary-General of ICSID should
appoint someone who is "experienced in international law and investment matters"), with
arts. 2009(2), 2010(1), 2011(1), at 696 (citing the additional qualifications of objectivity,
reliability, sound judgment, independence, and compliance with a code of conduct
established by the Free Trade Commission for state-to-state arbitrations, and requiring parties
to appoint panelists having the nationality of the opposing state).
177. Compare id., art 1135, at 646 (contemplating only "final awards" in investor-state
disputes), with arts. 2016-17, at 697 (requiring panels to issue both "initial" and "final
reports").
178. Compare id., art. 1136(6), at 646 (providing for enforcement of Chapter 11 awards
in municipal courts under the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, or the InterAmerican Convention), with arts. 2018-19, at 697-98 (calling for voluntary implementation
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established for commercial arbitration, Chapter 20 disputes follow a
pattern more familiar to interstate arbitration. 179 Because these
"procedural" differences represent a change in venue that may have
outcome-determinative effects, 180 it seems disingenuous to argue that
Chapter 11 claimants merely step into the shoes of their home states.
Third, while Chapter 11 awards may require payment of
compensatory damages, Chapter 20 decisions only offer prospective
relief from treaty violations. 181 Fourth, consistent with prevailing
norms of state-to-state adjudication, Chapter 20 does not subject the
decisions of panels to any form of review by municipal courts. If
NAFTA investors merely stepped into the shoes of their home states,
Chapter 11 probably would not contemplate any supervisory role for
municipal courts. 182 Because Chapter 11 provides for annulment of
awards by municipal courts (a hallmark of private commercial
arbitration), one must reject the assertion that Chapter 11 simply
permits investors to assert the public rights of their home states.
One must equally reject Mexico's and Canada's claims that
the public policy ramifications of Chapter 11 disputes remove them
from the scope of international commercial arbitration. 183 Observers
of long-standing debates about arbitrability will understand that
international commercial arbitrations frequently involve complex
184
issues of public regulatory law that affect society at large.
Although a few jurists contend that arbitrators lack the competence to
of panel reports in state-to-state disputes, but providing for suspension of treaty benefits in
the event of non-implementation).
179. Over a decade ago, Professor David Caron wrote an influential article about the
proper characterization of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which arguably exhibited
traits of both commercial arbitration and interstate arbitration. Professor Caron found the
adoption of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to be "very significant" evidence of an intent
to subject the tribunal to the model of commercial arbitration. He also observed that "[o]ther
tribunals have regarded the parties' choice of procedural rules as an indication of intent."
Caron, supra note 170, at 138.
180. See Charles H. Brower II, The Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution
to the Law of State Responsibility, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1571, 1578-79 & n.35 (1998).
See also Charles H. Brower, II, InternationalImmunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role
of Municipal Courts,41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 34 & n. 153 (2000).
181. Compare NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1135, at 646 (authorizing awards of monetary
damages or restitution), with arts. 2018(2), 2019(1), at 697-98 (contemplating nonimplementation or removal of non-conforming measures).
182. Cf Caron, supra note 170, at 131 (indicating that if parties adopt the model of
interstate arbitration, they probably intend to subject the awards to review "under the
internationallegal system") (emphasis added).
183. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 145-52; Canada's
Outline of Argument, supranote 14, at paras. 5-7.
184. See BORN, supra note 113, at 283 (stating that "most public law claims are capable
of being arbitrated").
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resolve such disputes, 185 the prevailing view holds that "concerns of
international comity" and "respect for the capacities of...
transnational tribunals" justify the arbitration of complex,
international disputes involving public regulatory law. 186 Likewise,
observers have long discredited the notion that states may invoke
187
domestic laws and policies to disown their arbitration agreements.
In Chapter 11 claims, however, the clash between commercial
and noncommercial regulatory interests becomes more pronounced
because every claim involves a private investor's challenge of state
action. Therefore, Chapter 11 represents an attempt to create a
balanced regime for managing disputes that have significant
commercial and noncommercial elements. 188
Under these
circumstances, identification of the "true nature" of Chapter 11
disputes as essentially commercial or noncommercial seems
impossible, at least on the basis of objective criteria. 189 Because the
characteristics of Chapter 11 disputes do not provide a reliable basis
for classification as commercial or noncommercial, analysis should
focus on the intent of NAFTA Parties to subject Chapter 11
proceedings to the legal framework customarily applied to
international commercial arbitration. 190 In this regard, it bears
185. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
658-66, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3370-74 (1985) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
186. Id. at 629.
187. See BORN, supra note 113, at 238 ("In general, neither arbitral tribunals nor national
courts have allowed sovereign states to rely on their own laws to disown their arbitration
agreements."); Dodge, supra note 13, at 191 n.57 (arguing that NAFTA Parties, having
submitted to Chapter 11, cannot resist enforcement of awards the grounds that they violate
public policy). Even if individuals lack the capacity to waive public rights, the NAFTA
Parties surely do not. Cf BORN, supra note 113, at 245, 253 (observing that historical
justifications for nonarbitrability rest on the idea that certain claims involve "public values"
that transcend the interests of individual plaintiffs).
188. See Alvarez, supra note 39, at 407, 430; Brower, supra note 4, at 41; David R.
Haigh, Chapter 11-Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Frankensteinor Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 132 (2000).
189. Cf BORN, supra note 113, at 150 (observing that courts have struggled to define
commercial activities for purposes of foreign sovereign immunity and indicating that
"[s]imilar debates may arise" with respect to arbitration); ALBERT J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 53 (1981) (recognizing that in the field of
sovereign immunity it can be difficult to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
transactions, and explaining the term "'commercial' may be understood differently in various
countries").
190. See Caron, supra note 170, at 107, 126-27 (arguing that where circumstances do
not provide a reliable guide for identifying the legal (i.e., commercial or noncommercial)
character of an arbitration, analysis should focus on identifying the legal system that the
parties intended to govern the validity of the arbitration). Cf Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
(authorizing recourse to supplementary means of treaty interpretation when textual analysis
yields an ambiguous result). Alternatively, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention recognizes
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repeating that NAFTA's objectives include the enlargement of
investment opportunities and the creation of a "predictable
commercial framework for business planning and investment." 191 To
achieve this goal, Chapter 11 creates a bargain between host states
and investors: "The terms of this bargain are that those who respond
to the invitation from the host country to invest their ... resources...
may be assured that the basic standards of fairness spelled out in
Section A of192 Chapter 11 will be fully observed by the host
govermment."
The bargain also includes the assurance that investors may
enforce standards of fairness through investor-state
arbitration, which
193
bypasses the municipal courts of host states.
Thus, Chapter 11 alters the traditional, hierarchical
relationship between foreign investors and host states in two ways.
First, it prohibits certain exercises of sovereignty at the expense of
foreign investors. Second, it creates a mechanism for resolving
investment disputes that places foreign investors and their host states
on a more equal footing.194 Because investors do not have to rely on
the mercy of their host states or their home states for protection,
Chapter 11 redistributes bargaining power in a manner more
reminiscent of relationships between commercial actors. As one U.S.
negotiator of Chapter 11 explained, the point of this exercise is to
remove investment disputes from "the political195realm and put them
more into the realm of commercial arbitration."
Consistent with this goal, the NAFTA Parties agreed to
consider claims submitted to arbitration under Chapter 11 "to arise
the propriety of examining intent to confirm the court's interpretation of Chapter 11 as a form
of commercial arbitration.
191. NAFTA, supra note 2, Preamble, at 297.
192. Haigh, supra note 188, at 128.
193. See Thomas, supra note 28, at 113 (describing investor-state arbitration as a bargain
made available to investors by NAFTA Parties). See also Mexico's Outline of Argument,
supra note 14, at para. 229 (stating that the purposes of Chapter 11 include "remov[al] [of]
damages claims from the domestic courts of the State of the investment at the instance of the

investor").
194. See Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then ShouldJudge?:Developing the
InternationalRule ofLaw UnderNAFTA Chapter11, 2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 193, 196 (2001); see
also Greider, supra note 3 (indicating that Chapter 11 permits investors "to challenge
governments as 'an open class of legal equals').
195. Price, supra note 4, at 112. See also Alvarez, supra note 39, at 393-94 (indicating
that Chapter 11 "provides guaranteed access to international commercial arbitration")
(emphasis added); William W. Park, Arbitration and the FISC: NAFTA 's 'Tax Veto, 2 CI.
J. INT'L L. 231,232 (2001) (explaining that Chapter 11 "endorses the long tradition of arbitral
dispute resolution underpinning much modem international business law").
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out of a commercial relationship or transaction" for the purposes 196
of
the New York Convention and the Inter-American Convention,
which govern the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.
While these instruments technically do not govern annulment
proceedings, the NAFTA Parties surely did not expect their courts to
place Chapter 11 disputes within a commercial framework when
enforcing arbitration agreements, transfer them to a noncommercial
framework when deciding whether to annul awards, and retransfer
them to a commercial framework when enforcing valid awards. 197 In
fact, state practice suggests the opposite, it being recalled that
Canadian federal law defines "commercial arbitration" to include
Chapter 11 proceedings brought against Canada. 198 It may be true
199
that the federal law only applies to claims brought against Canada,
but one struggles to understand why claims against Mexico or the
United States would require different treatment.
In short, the relationships that give rise to Chapter 11 disputes
defy easy characterization as "commercial" or "noncommercial."
Therefore, one must interpret Chapter 11 in light of the NAFTA
Parties' undertakings to "ensure a predictable commercial framework
for business planning and investment ' '20 0 and to put investors and host
states on a more equal footing. 20 1 These objectives, as implemented
by NAFTA and explained by its drafters, reflect an intent to place
Chapter 11 disputes within the deferential legal framework of
commercial arbitration for all purposes, including annulment
proceedings.
B.

The Architecture of Chapter11

Regardless of the characterization of investor-state disputes as
commercial or noncommercial, Canada submits that the following
elements of NAFTA's "architecture" demonstrate that Chapter 11
tribunals do not merit deference or protection by a high standard of
review:
196. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1136(7), at 646.
197. See Alvarez, supra note 39, at 418 (concluding that, in Chapter 11 annulment
proceedings before municipal courts, "the applicable grounds will be contained in the
relevant international commercial arbitration legislation") (emphasis added).
198. See supra notes 108, 130-31 and accompanying text.
199. See id.
200. See NAFTA, supra note 2, Preamble, at 297.
201. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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NAFTA Chapter Eleven Tribunals do not exhibit the
features of a specialised or expert administrative
tribunal. Chapter Eleven Tribunals are currently
appointed ad hoc and for single cases. There is no
Chapter Eleven secretariat or in-house specialists or
other institutional hallmark of expertise or special
authority. This contrasts with the standing secretariat
of the World Trade Organization supporting its dispute
settlement panels or the staff supporting permanent
domestic administrative tribunals.
Moreover, Tribunals can also be subject to binding
interpretations of provisions of the NAFTA by the
Commission (of the Parties' trade ministers): NAFTA
Article 1131(2).
Chapter Eleven tribunals only have the power to make
an award of monetary damages or restitution: NAFTA
Article 1135. They cannot strike down the impugned
measure or issue any form of injunctive, declaratory or
other extraordinary relief: NAFTA Article 1121. A
Chapter Eleven tribunal's authority to order interim
measures of protection is likewise limited: NAFTA
Article 1134.202
As noted above, these arguments appear to have influenced
the Supreme Court of British Columbia's decision to grant partial
annulment of the Metalcladaward. After agreeing that the principles
underlying Canada's "pragmatic and functional approach" might be
"of assistance" in applying the ICAA,2 °3 the court neglected to accord
the tribunal the customary presumption ofjurisdictional propriety and
appeared
to review some of the tribunal's legal conclusions de
204
novo.
Consideration of NAFTA's architecture should start not with
mechanical provisions, but with first principles. These include the
general objectives of NAFTA (creation of "effective procedures for
the... resolution of disputes"), 2 05 as well as the specific objectives of
Chapter 11 (establishment of a "mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among
202.
203.
204.
205.

Canada's Outline of Argument, supra note 14, at paras. 25-27.
See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note 15, at para. 54.
See supra notes 152-53, 157-65 and accompanying text.
NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 102(1)(e), at 297.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[40:43

investors of the Parties... and due process before an impartial
tribunal").2 °6 One must also recall that the NAFTA Parties have
consented to binding arbitration of investor-state disputes, 207 (subject
to revision or annulment but not appeal).2 °8 Having consented to
binding arbitration, the NAFTA Parties cannot
frustrate that
20 9
obligation by condoning extensive judicial review.
Furthermore, although the Canadian government may not have
been the respondent in the Metalelad arbitration, it can hardly claim
the status of a disinterested third party. To the contrary, Canada
submitted arguments to the Metalclad tribunal in accordance with

206. Id., art. 1115, at 642.
207. See id. art. 1136(1), at 646; Alvarez, supra note 39, at 395.
208. In international practice, "revision" differs from appeal in that it requires discovery
of "decisive" new facts that were unknown to the tribunal and the party seeking revision. J.L.
SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 242 (1959). Also, revision does not
permit the reweighing of facts or law. See id.
In modem international practice, courts may use "annulment" to rectify gross
procedural injustices (such as excess ofjurisdiction or denial of the right of audience), but not
mistakes of law. See BORN, supra note 108, at 708-09; JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHN LOWE,
THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (1999); W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 502-03 (3d ed. 2000); ALAN
REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 434 (3d ed. 1999); Caron, supra note 170, at 115; Pearce & Coe, supra note 58,
at 340; see also Park, supra note 195, at 235 ("Courts should exercise... control.., over the
arbitration's basic procedural integrity (looking at matters such as bias, excess of authority
and due process), but should not second guess the arbitrator on the substantive merits of the
dispute.").
In the past, some observers identified "essential error" as a ground for annulment.
See SIMPSON & Fox, supra, at 257. But see JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 98 (1929) (expressing the view that "no authority"
believes that an award "may be attacked because of erroneous appreciation either of the facts
or of the law applicable to them"). One may attribute this practice to the need for judicial
control over arbitrators who, at that time, often had no legal training. See REDERN &
HUNTER, supra, at 436 n. 13. Even this practice did not, however, permit annulment based on
routine errors of fact or law. See SIMPSON & Fox, supra,at 256-57.
By contrast, an "appeal" suggests the opportunity to reexamine "any aspect of the
decision with full opportunity accorded to the parties to argue." W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
NULLrY AND REviSION 212 (1971).
209. See Iran v. United States, paras. 63, 69, 1998 WL 1157733 (holding that the
submission to "final and binding" arbitration "rules out the possibility of readjudication of the
merits of [the award] by a municipal court"); M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87
F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996) (indicating that an agreement on the finality of an award
precludes de novo review of the merits); CRAIG ET AL., supra note 208, at 501 ("[P]arties to
arbitration seek a reasonable measure of finality. On signing the arbitration agreement, the
business managers do not expect that after a dispute has been decided by the arbitrator it will
be tried yet again on the substantive merits before a judge."); MANLEY 0. HUDSON,
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 124 (1944) ("If the parties to an agreement desire action falling
short of a binding decision, the proceeding will lack one of the chief characteristics ofjudicial
process.").
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Article 1128 of NAFTA 210 and has taken an active role as intervenor
in the annulment proceedings. 2 11 Canada has also filed its own
petition for annulment of the S.D. Myers award and appears likely to
propound similar arguments in those proceedings. 212 Under these
circumstances it seems unlikely that Canadian courts represent the
"impartial tribunal" charged with consideration of the merits under
Article 1115.213
Article 1115 also seeks to provide equal treatment to the
investors of different NAFTA Parties by removing their claims from
the eccentricities of municipal legal systems and submitting them2to
14
the more generic process of international commercial arbitration.
Extensive litigation in municipal courts following arbitration would
both undermine that goal and frustrate the
undertaking to create
2 15
effective mechanisms for dispute resolution.
Finally, the requirement that claimants waive their rights to
"initiate or continue ... any proceedings with respect to the
216
[challenged] measure" in the municipal courts of NAFTA Parties
presumably disables them from requesting heightened judicial review
of the merits after the close of arbitral proceedings.217 Because equal
treatment of disputing parties constitutes an "overriding principle" of
Chapter 11 arbitration,2 18 one must conclude that the NAFTA Parties
210. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),
availableat http://www. pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html at para. 24.
211. See supra notes 103, 127, 132-43 and accompanying text.
212. See supranote 104 and accompanying text.
213. Brower & Steven, supra note 194, at 196 (explaining that "the fundamental reason
that.., investment treaties have opted for international adjudication is that domestic courts
are often in fact, and, just as important, usually perceived to be biased against alien
investors").
214. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1115, at 642 (establishing a "mechanism for the
settlement of investment disputes that assures.., equal treatment among investors of the
Parties in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity"); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, Decision by Tribunal (Sept. 6, 2000) at para. 1.5 (identifying equality of treatment as
an "overriding principle" in NAFTA arbitrations conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules),
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
215. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 208, at 417-18 ("By choosing arbitration, the
parties choose a system of dispute resolution that results in a decision that is... final and
binding. It is not intended to be... the first step on a ladder of appeals through national
courts."); see also Caron, supra note 170, at 125 ("In negotiating arbitration clauses,
companies and states are seeking an alternative to the local courts. This alternative can be
truly acceptable only if it provides an effective remedy.").
216. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1121(l)-(2), at 643 (emphasis added).
217. The Article 1121 waiver does not, however, preclude investors from commencing
revision or annulment proceedings based on gross procedural irregularities, as opposed to
errors of fact and law. See Gantz, supra note 10.
218. See Pope & Talbot, Inc., Decision by Tribunal at para. 1.5.
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similarly lack the capacity to seek heightened judicial review of
awards.
Thus, Chapter 1 's basic structure does not permit extensive
judicial review of awards. Furthermore, it virtually eliminates the
need for such review. Although Canada doubts the expertise of
Chapter 11 tribunals, 2 19 disputing parties will certainly appoint
arbitrators who have experience in international law and investment
matters. In Metalclad, for example, the parties selected Sir Elihu
Lauterpacht as the presiding arbitrator. Sir Elihu has served as Judge
Ad Hoc on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), President of the
World Bank Administrative Tribunal, arbitrator in numerous
international disputes, as well as counsel in several proceedings
before the ICJ, the European Commission for Human Rights, and the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 220
As its party-appointed
arbitrator, the claimant selected Benjamin R. Civiletti, a former
Attorney General of the United States who has appeared before the
ICJ and served on another Chapter 11 tribunal.221 Mexico appointed
Jos6 Luis Siqueiros, a Mexican law professor, who has been a
member of the Organization of American States' Inter-American
Juridical Committee,222 the International Council for Commercial
Arbitration (ICCA), 223 and the NAFTA Advisory Committee on
Private Commercial Disputes. 224 One suspects that the relevant
expertise of the Metalclad arbitrators noticeably exceeds that of their
counterparts on the North American bench.225
219. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
220. See Curriculum Vitae of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE, QC, at
http://www.20essexst.com/barristers/ lauterpacht.html.
221. See Curriculum Vitae of Benjamin R. Civiletti, at http://www.venable.com. See
also Gantz, supra note 10.
222. See Jonathan T. Fried, The Inter-American Juridical Committee and International
Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 208 (2000).
223. See Jos6 Luis Siqueiros, Mexican Arbitration-TheNew Statute, 30 TEX.INT'L L.J.
227, 227 n.tt (1995).
224. See Advisory Committee on NAFTA Established,MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Nov.
1994, at 13.
225. See Brower & Steven, supra note 194, at 201 ("The arbitrators participating in these
cases are highly competent members of academia and the international bar, with experience
and expertise in the relevant areas of law exceeding that of the vast majority of the domestic
judiciary in each of the three NAFTA countries."); Gantz, supra note 10 (referring to
Civiletti, Lauterpacht, and Siqueiros as "some of the best known and most highly respected
lawyers in North America (or elsewhere)"); see also Brower & Steven, supra note 194, at
196 ("[Djomestic courts often do not have the legal expertise and experience to free
themselves from the confines of their own domestic regimes so as to give proper attention
and respect to international law...".); Brower, International Immunities: Some Dissident
Views on the Role of Municipal Courts, supra note 180, at 62 (observing that "a municipal
judge sitting by herself would find it difficult to step out of her own legal tradition and to
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One must take an equally suspicious view of assertions that
Chapter 11 tribunals, unlike WTO dispute-settlement panels, lack the
support of a permanent secretariat. To begin with, several claims are
proceeding under the Additional Facility Rules, pursuant to which the
ICSID Secretariat renders administrative and logistical support to the
tribunals. 226 Furthermore, although Chapter 11 tribunals do not have
the benefit of a permanent legal staff, they have something much
better. Since all NAFTA Parties have the right to submit arguments
to Chapter 11 tribunals regarding interpretation of NAFTA, 227 the
tribunals often receive briefings from all three NAFTA Parties. This
right of participation ensures that tribunals will be fully prepared to
resolve difficult interpretive questions. In any event, it adequately
compensates for the lack of a permanent secretariat.
The right of participation also makes it unlikely that Chapter
11 tribunals will adopt unreasonable legal positions. 22 Because the
NAFTA Parties have the collective authority to formulate binding
interpretations of Chapter 11,229 one may assume that tribunals will
give the most serious consideration to arguments propounded
vigorously and unanimously by the NAFTA Parties. Even if a
Chapter 11 tribunal were to commit an interpretive blunder, the
NAFTA Parties could restore doctrinal integrity through collective
action. 230
This mechanism eliminates the need for unilateral
identify ... general principles [of law] common to major legal systems," and explaining that
"[a] panel of three experienced arbitrators from different countries would be better suited to

the task").
226. Pearce & Coe, supra note 58, at 321; David J. St. Louis, The Anatomy of a Chapter
Eleven Arbitration:Affidavits, Affiant, and Burdens ofProof,23 HASTINGS INT'L & COM. L.
REv. 345, 352 (2000) (remarks of Joseph de Pencier, counsel to Canada in the Metalcladand
S.D. Myers annulment proceedings); Thomas, supra note 28, at 121.
227. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1128, at 645; Thomas, supra note 28, at 103.
228. Pearce & Coe, supra note 58, at 338 (indicating that submissions under Article 1128
"may provide an important check upon fanciful theories of recovery or treaty interpretations
proffered by only one NAFTA Party").
229. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1131(2), at 645.
230. In recent publications, lawyers for Canada and the United States have issued thinlyveiled warnings that the failure of tribunals to heed the unanimous views of NAFTA Parties
could trigger the adoption of binding interpretive statements-or worse. See Joseph de
Pencier, Investment, Environment and Dispute Settlement: Arbitration Under NAFTA
ChapterEleven, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & Cow. L. REv. 409, 415 (2000) ("It remains to be seen
whether the tribunal in S.D. Myers will accept this tri-lateral position [that Article 1110 does
not expand the liability for expropriation beyond the scope already imposed by customary
international law], or whether the NAFTA Parties will have to enshrine it in an Article
1131(2) binding interpretation."); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Contract Without Privity:
Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 CGU. J. INT'L L. 183, 190 (2001) ("Tribunals
should reconsider their reluctance to credit [the insistence of NAFTA Parties on strict]
compliance with the [procedural] terms of Section B.... State Parties are likely to continue
urging narrow construction of the Chapter, and are justified in so doing.... [J]udicious
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adjustment of Chapter 11 jurisprudence by the courts of individual
NAFTA Parties. Furthermore, such unilateral review would probably
conflict with the good-faith performance of the undertaking to
formulate doctrinal adjustments through a collective decision-making
process.
To be sure, interpretive statements only have prospective
effect and, therefore, provide no relief from erroneous legal decisions
in particular cases. Nevertheless, the possibility of discrete blunders
represents an inherent risk of arbitration, which the NAFTA Parties
assumed when consenting to Chapter 11.231 In addition, the NAFTA
Parties have minimized that risk by prohibiting injunctive relief and
punitive damages. 232 Under these circumstances, Chapter 11 awards
cannot prevent the application of important public regulatory
measures and should not expose NAFTA Parties to disproportionate
liability. Furthermore, if the Metalclad award provides any indication
of future behavior, one might predict that tribunals
will not be overly
233
damages.
compensatory
awarding
generous in
Finally, one should mention the deference that tribunals have
shown to the NAFTA Parties when deciding the merits of Chapter 11
claims. In the very first award on the merits of a Chapter 11 claim,
the tribunal recognized that it did not serve an appellate function and
had no authority to set aside domestic court judgments for a lack of
persuasive force.234 Another tribunal acknowledged that it did not
possess a mandate to "second-guess" the policy choices of NAFTA

construction... of Chapter 11 will ensure that it survives to inform the next generation of
dispute settlement agreements.").
As noted above, cabinet-level representatives of NAFTA Parties purported to adopt
the first set of Notes of Interpretation in July 2001, but there are serious questions regarding
the validity and effect of their provisions. See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, supra note 71.
231. Thomas, supra note 28, at 136 ("There is always the chance.., that the tribunal
will interpret a legal obligation in a way that the drafters did not anticipate. This is a fact of
life."). See also Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues Of Lawlessness: A "Second
Look" at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 494 (1999)
(observing that the characteristics of international commercial arbitration make it unlikely to
yield legally correct outcomes with flawless predictably); cf Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier, supra note 113, (enforcing an arbitral award
despite obvious legal errors).
232. See NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1134, 1135, at 646.
233. As noted above, the tribunal awarded the investor only $16,685,000 (plus postaward interest), representing a modest fraction of its $115,000,000 claim. See supra note 81
and accompanying text.
234. Azinian v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (1999) at paras. 84, 99.
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Parties. 235 As noted above, the award also established the principle
that tribunals must consider the "high measure of deference that
international law generally extends to .. . domestic authorities to
regulate matters within their ...borders. ' 236 Most recently, a third
tribunal declined to "substitute its judgment for... Canada's" or to
impose liability for regulatory actions that constituted "reasonable" or
"rational" resp onses to challenges faced by the Canadian
government. 231 These holdings demonstrate that tribunals do not
want to interfere with legitimate efforts to regulate in the public
interest, have recognized the limited scope of their powers, and have
resisted the temptation to undertake open-ended examinations of
governmental actions. 238 While it may be premature to draw
definitive conclusions, Chapter 11 tribunals show no sign of engaging
in behavior that might warrant extensive judicial review. 239 Thus,
even if one could overcome the legal obstacles, one struggles to
identify a convincing policy justification for subjecting the decisions
of Chapter 11 tribunals to heightened review.
V.

LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNILATERAL

REVIEW

If, as concluded above, heightened judicial review of the
Metalclad award represents an independent violation of Chapter 11,
one would anticipate the visitation of adverse consequences upon
Canada for its unlawful conduct. For technical and political reasons,
however, Canada seems likely to escape the imposition of liability for
this transgression. In fact, the NAFTA Parties theoretically might
adopt a general policy of subjecting Chapter 11 awards to heightened
review without suffering immediate legal consequences. These
circumstances may tend to support the image of heightened review as
a cost-free instrument for defending the regulatory sovereignty of
NAFTA Parties. That description seems untenable, however, because
the reinvigoration of sovereignty would inhibit development of the
rule of law in international economic relations.
235. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) (separate opinion of
Bryan Schwartz) at para. 261, http://wvw.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
236. Id. atpara. 263.
237. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at paras.
78, 93, 102, 123, 125, 128, 155.
238. See Brower, supra note 4, at 38.
239. Id. at 42.
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To the extent that they violate Section A of Chapter 11,
judicial decisions can provide the basis for the assertion of claims
directly by investors under Chapter 11.240 Thus, one might assume
that the investor in Metalclad could initiate a new arbitration against
Canada for the losses caused by heightened judicial review of the
Metalclad award. 24 ' The Metalclad claimant could not bring such a
claim against Canada, however, because Chapter 11 only provides
remedies to investors of one NAFTA Party having (or seeking to
make) investments in a second NAFTA Party for measures relating to
their investments in the second NAFTA Party.242 Investments do not
include "any ... claims to money[] that do not involve" interests in
enterprises, equity securities of enterprises, certain debt securities of
enterprises, certain loans to enterprises, rights to share in the profits or
assets of enterprises, property acquired for business purposes, or
interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources to
economic activity on the territory of another NAFTA Party.2 43 Since
the Metalcladclaimant has an investment in Mexico (but not Canada),
the award would not constitute a claim to money involving one of the
enumerated interests in Canada. As a result, judicial review does not
constitute a measure relating to an investor or an investment in
Canada. Therefore, the Metalclad claimant lacks standing under
Chapter 11 to challenge excessive judicial review by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia. Similarly situated investors would
encounter the same lack of standing to challenge heightened review of
Chapter 11 awards by courts outside of their host states.
On the other hand, some investors would have standing under
Chapter 11 to challenge heightened review of Chapter 11 awards. For
example, in S.D. Myers, a U.S. company submitted a claim against
Canada alleging various breaches of Section A with respect to its
investment in a Canadian enterprise. 244 The tribunal selected Toronto
as the seat of arbitration. After the tribunal issued a partial-final
award on the merits against it, Canada initiated annulment
proceedings in the Federal Court of Canada.245 If that court were to
engage in extensive review of the merits, the investor would have
240. Loewen v. US, supra note 6, at para. 49, 52-55, 60 (holding that judicial decisions
can be "measures" subject to challenge under Chapter 11).
241. See Iran v. US, supra note 208 (granting an Iranian claim for damages based on a
U.S. violation of the Algiers Accords, namely judicial review of the merits of an award
previously issued by the tribunal).
242. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1101(1), at 639.
243. See id.art. 1139, at 647.
244. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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standing to raise a new Chapter 11 claim because the judicial decision
would constitute a measure relating to a claim to money having one of
the enumerated interests in a Canadian enterprise. 246 Similarly
situated investors would likewise have standing under Chapter 11 to
challenge heightened review of Chapter 11 awards by courts sitting in
their host states.
If they overcome the problem of standing investors will,
however, face additional difficulties in prosecuting new Chapter 11
claims that seek redress for heightened review of Chapter 11 awards.
Heightened judicial review arguably violates the obligation to create a
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures due
process before an impartialtribunal and results in a binding award not
subject to appeal.247 It may also violate the undertaking to correct
doctrinal errors through collective action by the Free Trade
Commission. 248 Yet, the NAFTA Parties would surely point out that
Chapter 11 only permits investor-state arbitration of claims alleging
violations of Section A, whereas the foregoing obligations appear in
Section B. 249 Anticipating such objections, investors might use the
vocabulary of Section A to plead claims challenging heightened
review. Thus, they might characterize heightened review as a denial
of justice, which violates the minimum standard of treatment under
customary international law and, therefore, Article 1105.250 They
might also describe heightened review as the violation of treaty
provisions designed to protect investors and, therefore, a denial of the
fair and equitable treatment required by Article 1105.251 Finally, if
investors could establish that the relevant court system has shown
greater deference to awards rendered to domestic investors or
investors from third countries, they might also establish the
incompatibility of heightened252review with the principles of national
treatment or MFN treatment.
Because previous Chapter 11 tribunals have interpreted the
phrase "fair and equitable treatment" to incorporate treaty obligations
246. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1101(1), at 639 ("This Chapter applies to measures
adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors of another Party; [and] (b)
investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the Party...
247. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
248. See supra text following note 230.
249. See NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1116(1), 1117(1), at 642-43.
250. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 59, 66, 89 and accompanying text.
252. For example, the failure to apply a customary and "powerful" presumption that the
arbitrators acted within their jurisdiction might constitute a denial of national treatment or
MFN treatment.
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stated elsewhere with greater specificity, investors have a reasonable
prospect of convincing future tribunals that heightened judicial review
of Chapter 11 awards constitutes a violation of Article 1105(1). Even
if a Chapter 11 tribunal reached that conclusion, however, the
respondent NAFTA Party would have the right to seek annulment of
the award by a municipal court at the seat of arbitration. Furthermore,
if one adopts the premise that municipal courts are inclined to
substitute their own opinions for the rulings of Chapter 11 tribunals,
they seem highly unlikely to honor awards that condemn heightened
review. In short, because Chapter 11 awards always remain subject to
annulment by municipal courts, the Chapter 11 process seems to
provide an ineffective tool for dealing with a widespread practice of
heightened review by municipal courts.
If Chapter 11 proves to be an useless tool for counteracting
heightened review, two other avenues exist in theory, but neither
seems likely to provide investors with much comfort. First, the
investors' states of nationality could request formation of dispute
settlement panels under Chapter 20 of NAFTA to address alleged
violations of Chapter 11.253 For two reasons, however, the United
States seems unlikely to espouse Metalclad's objections to heightened
judicial review of Chapter 11 awards. One reason is that the United
States faces at least three Chapter 11 proceedings, in which claims for
damages approach $2,000,000,000 and in which the United States
represents the seat of arbitration. 254 Faced with liabilities of that
magnitude, the United States has little incentive to advocate principles
that would circumscribe the role of its own courts in reviewing the
merits of future awards. 255 Additionally, the United States has
already taken the position that Chapter 11 proceedings do not arise
out of commercial relationships and that the deferential legal
framework for commercial arbitration generally does not apply to
Chapter 11 awards. 256 In short, the United States seems unlikely to
take up the issue of heightened review in a Chapter 20 claim because
it has a political interest in maintaining possible avenues for
challenging liability imposed by future awards. The remaining
NAFTA Parties face similar inhibitions in making heightened review
the subject of Chapter 20 claims.

253. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1136(5), at 646; Thomas, supra note 28, at 136.
254. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
255. Pearce & Coe, supra note 58, at 338 (observing that "NAFTA Parties are unlikely
to endorse interpretations and theories of recovery that enlarge their own exposure to
claims").
256. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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If Chapter 20 also seems unlikely to provide any relief from
heightened review, investors might have one final hope for
overcoming the partial or complete annulment of Chapter 11 awards,
namely applications for enforcement of those awards in a third
country.
For example, the Metalclad claimant could seek
enforcement of its award in Mexico or the United States
notwithstanding the partial annulment by Canadian courts. The New
York Convention, which governs such enforcement proceedings,
exhibits a distinct bias against enforcement of awards annulled at the
seat of arbitration. 257 However, the New York Convention does not
forbid enforcement of such awards,258 and commentary supports the
enforcement of awards annulled on the basis of eccentric national
standards (such as a mistake of law), as opposed to international
standards (such as excess of jurisdiction or another gross procedural
defect). 259 Presumably, the outcome of the hypothetical enforcement
proceedings would depend on whether the enforcement forum
concentrated on the intrusive substance or the deferential rhetoric of
the judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. It seems
unlikely, however, that the enforcement forum would have much
enthusiasm for upsetting the outcome of the Metalclad annulment
proceedings. Mexico's courts would certainly not wish to subject
their government to a liability already avoided by Canadian courts.
Likewise, U.S. courts would not relish the prospect of offending both
Canada and Mexico in order to vindicate private interests that the U.S.
government found insufficiently compelling to warrant action under
Chapter 20 of NAFTA.
Based on the foregoing, it appears that NAFTA Parties could
frequently perform heightened review of Chapter 11 awards without
triggering additional claims for liability. Nevertheless, promiscuous
use of this strategy would have devastating effects on the operation of
NAFTA and, indeed, the development of international economic law.
Canada, Mexico and the United States adopted NAFTA to ensure'260
"a
predictable... framework for business planning and investment.
The objectives of NAFTA also include the substantial increase of
investment opportunities and the creation of effective procedures for
resolving disputes. 261 Consistent with these objectives, arbitration
should mark the end-and not the beginning-of investor-state
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(1)(e).
See CRAIG ET AL., supranote 208, at 504.
Id. at 506-07.
NAFTA, supranote 2, Preamble, at 297.
See id. art. 102(1)(c) and (e), at 297.
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disputes. The prospect of lengthy annulment proceedings by itself
threatens to diminish investor confidence by preventing the speedy
resolution of disputes with host states. 262 If municipal courts take the
annulment process one step further by permitting the easy reopening
of awards, they will cripple a system of neutral adjudication designed
to promote
the flow of capital across the borders of NAFTA
26 3
Parties.
Furthermore, the NAFTA Parties cannot retreat from
commitments to investor-state arbitration under Chapter 11 without
encouraging developing states to renege on their own commitments to
their investors under BITs. 264 Conceivably, heightened judicial
review of Chapter 11 awards could prompt a loss of respect for
investor-state arbitration worldwide. 265 In the end, heightened
review might require us to forsake a century's worth of efforts to
promote the development of266
robust principles of state responsibility
for economic injury to aliens.

262. Brower & Steven, supra note 194, at 196 (explaining that "[i]nvestor confidence...
is not furthered by requiring [extensive] domestic litigation"). Cf Reisman, supra note 153,
at 786-87 (expressing concern that the frequent use of annulment proceedings would render
ICSID arbitration unattractive and raise questions about its long-term viability as a system of
dispute resolution).
263. Park, supra note 195, at 241 ("Overly zealous intervention by governments would
tear at the fabric of neutral arbitration that underpins investor confidence in cross-border
capital flows."). See also HUDSON, supra note 209, at 126 (stating that the "[d]ecisions of
international tribunals have seldom been subject to reconsideration on appeal by other
tribunals" because the "provision for appeal would seriously undermine the authority of
decisions"); REISMAN, supra note 208, at 185 (discussing the "debilitating effect the
expectation of easy reopening of decisions" could have on the function of international
tribunals); Christine Chinkin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of InternationalDispute
Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 39, 68-69 (1991) ("The finality of an arbitral
award is especially significant from the perspective of dispute resolution, as it is clear that
when awards are challenged, for whatever reason, the effectiveness of the process is
subverted and the usefulness of arbitration becomes questionable.").
264. In the words of one observer, "[a] power is evidently not at liberty, if it wishes to
maintain the respect of other nations, to change without plausible reason its attitude on
questions of international law, and the arguments used on one occasion may, therefore,
validly be brought up against it in another conflict." Sir John Fischer Williams, International
Law and the Property of Aliens, 1928 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 6. Cf Gantz, supra note 10,
(warning that U.S. attempts to narrow the scope of Chapter 11 would create a "great" risk of
"reducing the scope of American investor provisions based on the same or similar language
in BITs").
265. Gantz, supra note 10 ("If every decision lost by a government is challenged in
court.., and if the courts entertain review on the merits, the efficacy of the Chapter 11
process will be seriously damaged, and [the NAFTA Parties] may weaken respect for
[investor-state arbitration] worldwide.").
266. Price, supra note 4, at 113-14 (warning NAFTA Parties not to let the exigencies of
defending particular Chapter I1 claims result in the sacrifice of important principles of state
responsibility). See also Sandrino, supra note 60, at 265, 326 (observing that Chapter 11
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More fundamentally, heightened judicial review represents a
serious deviation from the trend in international economic law toward
voluntary adherence to authoritative decisions rendered at the
international level by impartial bodies charged with the supervision of
treaty compliance. 267 If our municipal authorities assume the right to
substitute their own opinions for those of Chapter 11 tribunals, we
cannot expect other states to accord any greater respect to the
decisions of WTO dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body.
By encouraging municipal officials to follow their own interpretations
of treaty obligations, we seriously impair the character of treaty
provisions as rules of law.268 Likewise, if international tribunals
cannot resolve disputes without appeal to the judgment of the
interested parties themselves, we cannot expect tribunals to269
secure
order--or the rule of law-in international economic relations.
Nor can we necessarily limit the consequences of heightened
review to the sphere of international economic law.270 Although
Professor Jos6 Alvarez has derisively referred to Chapter 11 as a
"bizarre human rights treaty.., for a special-interest group," 271 the
fact remains that Chapter 11 represents a notable triumph of
individual rights over sovereign power. Because the treatment of
sovereignty in commercial disputes often heralds the development of
similar trends in other areas, 272 opponents of Chapter 11 should not
reflects traditional principles of state responsibility advocated by developed states since the
end of the nineteenth century).
267. MERRILLS, supra note 71, at 198-99, 214, 218 (describing the evolution from the
political resolution of trade disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the
model of binding adjudication under the WTO agreements, which are "intended to lay the
foundations of the international economic order in the next century"); Price, supra note 78, at
428 (observing that voluntary acceptance of the decisions of international tribunals
"underpins the international economic order").
268. See SIR HERscH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CoMMUNITY 424 (1966).
269. See id. at 425. See also JENKS, supra note 71, at 757 (arguing that "institutional
arrangements not grounded in respect for law are a masque for arbitrary power, incapable of
growth into a lasting political order").
270. See JENKS, supra note 71, at 771, 776 (observing that the spirit with which
municipal courts approach the decisions of international tribunals "may be of far-reaching
importance for the future of the rule of law in world affairs," and explaining that the "future
of international adjudication cannot be abstracted from the context of the future of
international organisation generally, nor the future of international organisation from that of
the whole future of society").
271. Jos6 E.Alvarez, CriticalTheory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's
ChapterEleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 303, 307-08 (1997).
272. For example, the concept of restricted state immunity first achieved broad
acceptance for claims involving the commercial (or non-sovereign) activities of foreign
states. See JORGEN BROHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17-
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assume that we can reinvigorate sovereignty at the expense of
individual rights in economic matters without jeopardizing the
capacity of international law to promote other forms of individual
rights.
Even if one does not accept such dire predictions about the
systemic consequences of increased judicial supervision of investorstate arbitration, one should at least heed Chief Justice Burger's
prophetic warning that "the expansion of. . .business and industry
will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn [agreements],
we insist on [the] parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts."273
VI.

CONCLUSION

The unexpected proliferation of Chapter 11 claims has
generated public concern about the erosion of regulatory sovereignty,
especially in Canada and the United States. Although writers have
proposed a number of mechanisms to mitigate this apparent threat at
the international level, the NAFTA Parties have conceived a more
fiendishly clever plan for the restoration of national sovereignty:
heightened review of awards in annulment proceedings conducted by
municipal courts at the seat of arbitration. While this device may
create frequent opportunities for the NAFTA Parties to strike back
without incurring liability, its deployment bodes ill for the rule of law
in international economic relations.

19 (1997). The evolution of a workable commercial activities exception to foreign sovereign
immunity promoted discussion of similar exceptions for noncommercial torts, including
human rights abuses. See id. at 19-22. Furthermore, by creating a distinction between
sovereign and non-sovereign acts, the doctrine of restricted immunity arguably laid the
foundation for the arrest of General Augusto Pinochet for alleged violations of the Torture
Convention. See Michael Ratner, The Lords' Decision in Pinochet III, in THE PINOCHET
PAPERS 33, 42-46 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000) (describing the House of
Lords' conclusion that Pinochet lacked immunity because the alleged acts of torture did not
fall within the scope of his official functions as head of state).
273. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1912 (1972).

